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A SMART POWER Strategies to the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula

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Abstract

Purpose: The Purpose of this article is to analyze the smart power strategy to the peace process on the Korean Peninsula and to suggest alternatives to build permanent peacebuilding efforts. This paper seeks to answer a key question regarding building a peace regime. What is South Korea's smart power strategy for the peace regime building on the Korean Peninsula? Simultaneously, this paper also analyzes various South Korea's domestic opinions over the North Korean nuclear issues.

Method: This study analyzed ROK's Smart power strategies toward peace regime building on the Korean Peninsula. Smart Power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve objectives, drawing on both hard(military muscle, economic might) and soft power(economic aid, sharing culture). It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand the state's influence and establish the legitimacy of the action.

Results: The ROK's smart power strategies to the peace process are as follows. First, in terms of using alliance, South Korea has to call for the U.S to foster a peace regime building on the Korean Peninsula while cooperating with the Biden administration's democratic principle and ideology. Second, in terms of using partnership, South Korea has to induce China to put pressure on the DPRK to abandon nuclear weapons. Third, in terms of using institutions, ROK and DPRK have to transform the current 9/19 inter-Korean military agreement of the initial operational arms control into systemic arms control through early notification of mutual military training.

Conclusion: The essential components of smart power are using alliances, partnerships, and institutions, etc. In this context, South Korea has all the necessary elements of the ROK-US alliance and ROK-China economic partnership, and 9.19 inter-Korean military agreement. In the long and bumpy road of the peace regime building process, it needs strategic optimism in pushing ahead smart power strategies but in building defense posture, they need to be a strategic pessimist.

[Keywords] Smart Power, Strategy, Peace Process, North Korea, Alliance

1. Introduction

The Security contour on the Korean peninsula has remained largely unchanged since the end of the Cold War. North Korea's recent appeasement policy towards South Korea represents its major tactical shift to improve relations with the U.S. which is a critical means by which North Korea seeks to escape international isolation and economic sanction. At the same time, the DPRK is tightening its state-centered control under the Covid-19 pandemic.

As the six-party talks are in a stalemate, North Korea could try to take advantage of protracted talks to expand its nuclear capabilities. The US' long-standing goal has been to bring North Korea into compliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty(NPT) obligations - in effect, nuclear disarmament. But North Korea is approaching the Korean unification issue using the Vietnamese formula, to replace the truce agreement on the peninsular with a peace treaty with the US in a bid to bring

about the withdrawal of US troops in South Korea and achieve Korean unification under its initiative-without foreign intervention.

North Korea’s positive participation in the recent peace process on the Korean Peninsula is a "charm offensive" aimed at maximization of its political and economic gains after realizing a nuclear weapon state. Since the start of North Korea's charm offensive in 2018, there has been skepticism about the sincerity of North Korean leadership's commitment to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula[1].

Despite the long-standing mistrust between Pyongyang and Washington, North Korea also wants to hold bilateral talks with the US for the removal of the US nuclear umbrella over the South. Due to North Korea’s two-faced policy, it is difficult to maintain a consistent policy for South Korea.

This paper seeks a policy option by assessing the strategic environment for the peacebuilding process. What is South Korea’s smart power strategy for the peace regime building on the Korean Peninsula? Simultaneously, this paper also analyzes ROK's domestic polemic over policy toward the DPRK.

2. Assessment of Strategic Environment for the Peace Process

The peace process initiated by the Moon Jae-in government was pursued for the last 4 years regardless of North Korea's attitude and its policy changes, so South Korean administrations created an atmosphere in which the South could not react properly or reasonably to North Korean policy. South Korea's policy towards North Korea was unable to contribute to solving nuclear issues because it only concentrated on improving inter-Korean relations and shows of constructive engagement regardless of the nuclear situation. Moreover, the Moon Jae-in administration has reached the 9/19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement with the DPRK as an initial operational arms control[2].

However, the ROK government has to cope with the DPRK’s two-faced policy with a smart power strategy so as not to give the wrong signal that may condone its Nukes. According to the CSIS report, smart power is neither hard nor soft power, it is the skillful combination of both <Table 1>.

Table 1. Foundation of soft power[3].


International sources	Domestic sources
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Respect for international laws, norms, and institutions · Fundamental reliance on multilateralism, and disposition against excessive unilateralism · Respect for international treaties and alliance commitments · Willingness to sacrifice short-run national interests in order to contribute toward the collective good · Liberal foreign economic policies 	<p>Culture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Pronounced social cohesion · Elevated quality of life · Freedom · Sufficient opportunities · Tolerance · Alluring lifestyle · Cultural status(religious, racial, ethnic) <p>Political institutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Democracy · Constitutionalism · Liberalism/pluralism · Well functioning government bureaucracy

The Smart Power discourse is an American oriented concept that was firstly coined by Suzanne Nossel in 2004. Later in a CSIS report in 2007, that term was heavily promoted by the commission co-chaired by Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye. The exercise of hard power may meet with global disapproval, while the use of soft power becoming a more important asset.

Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve objectives, drawing on both hard(military muscle, economic might) and soft power(economic aid, sharing culture) as shown <Figure 1>. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand the state's influence and establish the legitimacy of the action. Given the high stakes involved, North Korean

proliferation, if unaddressed and unreversed, has the potential to destabilize the whole Northeast Asian region and beyond.

Figure 1. Definition of smart power[4].



South Korea's smart power strategy direction calls for 1)the implementation of a strategic opening policy toward North Korea which can induce the latter to dismantle its nuclear program and bring about real change, 2)the pursuit of a practical diplomatic course that is based on national interests, 3)the promotion of a stronger Korea-U.S alliance through which both nations' interests are fostered, 4)the expansion of Korea's Asian diplomacy, 5)strengthening of Korea's diplomatic contribution to the international community, 6)the internationalization of energy diplomacy, and 7)the fostering of increased opening and exchanges to fulfill the objective of turning Korea into a cultural powerhouse[5].

In the case of the North Korean provocations, the South has to respond with principles as follows[6].

- There should be a response to the DPRK's provocations, to ensure that it does not conclude that it may act with impunity.
- The possibility of achieving a significant change in North Korean policy is probably low now.
- In a practical sense, sanctions are more likely to be effective if they are multilateral in scope. And the political impact of a united front can be as important as the specific severity of the sanction.
- Pyongyang is likely to carry out more provocations, so it is useful to keep some sanctions in reserve. They should be increased incrementally. Incrementalism makes it easier to gain China's support.

In the interest of denuclearizing North Korea, the United States and its negotiating partners should pursue a comprehensive agreement that forges a credible path to a denuclearized peninsula through the use of a broad range of powerful incentives and disincentives. The Biden administration may rule out any rewards to North Korea without a verifiable denuclearization. The Biden administration's denuclearization negotiation with the DPRK can be a bottom-up style of CVID[7]. President-elect Biden however, stressed that the US would not pursue summit talks with North Korea as President Trump has. President Biden would only meet Kim Jong Un only under the condition of DPRK's drawing down of its nuclear capacity.

3. ROK's Domestic Polemic over Policy toward the DPRK

To lead North Korea to accept a reformist policy and change its society, the South and the interna-

tional community have to engage it and try to exchange diverse information so that the North Korean elite and citizens can harbor hope for a Kim Jong Un System. But the South will keep on participating in the current sanctions that are being imposed on North Korea until it gives up its nuclear weapons. The communist regime has yet to show any fundamental sign of abandoning its nuclear ambitions[8].

3.1. Conservatives

The “conservatives”, represented by hawkish policymakers, believe that South Korean and U.S. interests on the Korean Peninsula are not fundamentally divergent and that South Korea should prioritize relations with its long-time ally[9]. The conservative’s reasons for strengthening ROK-US alliances are as follows.

- South Korea is the immediate target of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles, which put innocent South Korean citizens at risk.
- North Korea ignores agreement with South Korea despite receiving its aid.
- Many conservatives feel that South Korea has consistently supported and provided assistance to North Korea, but has never received anything in return.
- South Korea should use its influence(international sanction) to change North Korea’s policy.
- South Korea should continue talking to the other five parties to exert influence over North Korea to scrap its nuclear weapons programs.

3.2. Leftists

The Leftists blame the US and South Korea’s Conservative government for the lack of progress on North Korea due to its failure to engage in bilateral talks, provide sufficient security assurances to North Korea and eventually normalize bilateral relations. The Primary “leftist” arguments are that South Korea cannot risk damaging the relationship with a counterpart of reunification. Therefore, South Korea must continue to provide aid to avert instability. The Leftists think that engagement has worked in other countries, most notably China and they believe that it was beginning to work in North Korea. While conservatives prone to see denuclearization as a precondition for peace and stability, conversely, leftists are likely to believe peace and stability are the preconditions for denuclearization. Seoul prefers the conservative approach <Table 2>.

Table 2. Conservatives and leftists position[10].

	North Korea's denuclearization policy first	Assisting economic aid package	Striking peace treaty	Peace and stability first policy
Conservatives	o	X	X	X
Leftists	X	o	o	o

3.3. Strategic optimists

Amid the UN enforce sanctions against North Korea, the strategic optimists think that North Korea cannot but come back to the negotiating table. They think that the North Korean regime insecurity may bring the government back to compromise in the denuclearization process[11]. The PRC could take a variety of steps to squeeze North Korea more subtly. Some such steps would involve making China’s banking facilities less and less convenient for the DPRK to use. Strategic optimists think that China also worries about North Korea’s nuclear ambitions may trigger an arms race in the Northeast Asian region. Citing these concerns of China, many optimists hope that China may press the DPRK into abandoning its nukes. Strategic optimists think that Pyongyang will only be willing to denuclearize if its cost-benefit and risk-reward calculations change. They may think that the North Korean regime tries to gain early incentives to maximize the benefits it could gain without fully relinquishing its nuclear program[12].

Strategic optimists want to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program and normalize the denuclea-

rization talks at the center stage[13]. Joel S. wit suggests that a US policy based on containment and isolation alone only concedes that North Korea will remain nuclear-armed and that its weapons programs will further develop. Therefore he argues that an effective American strategy towards North Korea will require a combination of tough measures with serious dialogue and engagement. Strategic optimists think that South Korea needs to encourage North Korea to make the policy change. To move in that direction, the South needs to go ahead with its policy to assist the North based on a policy change in the North and make economic cooperation with the North in such a way as to quicken North's change in policy and system. In this vein, South Korea can use the idea for a grand bargain as a strategic chip encouraging the North's change under the principle of free democracy and the market economy, plus its "new peace initiative."

To this end, they may suggest simultaneous talks on a peace regime that can and should be used as an institutional foundation for North Korea to abandon its nuclear arsenal. Under a peace regime, North Korea will find no ground to rely on nuclear weapons but will base its security on a legal basis. It is high time to realize that solving North Korea's nuclear issues has to be managed in the long-term perspectives. A quick solution may demand a lot of costs. The ultimate goal must remain a recommitment to the NPT. Short of that goal, however, it is desirable to move towards a mid-way station that would, at a minimum, a)halt further nuclear weapons development; b)cap fissile material production; and c)stop or minimize WMD-related exports[14].

3.4. Strategic pessimists

There will be little chance for a solution to North Korea's nuclear issues unless the North revises or changes its strategies toward South Korea and foreign countries. The North Korean regime views the development of nuclear weapons as key to preserving its political system in the face of what it interprets as a hostile US policy. North Korea's nuclear weapons program was closely connected with the country's security strategy[15]. Given its centrality for regime security, it cannot be abandoned unless DPRK regime security is fully guaranteed[16]. But Pyongyang's lack of trust in US security assurance may make the solution difficult to implement[17]. After almost thirty years of on-again, off-again bilateral and multilateral negotiations, preventing the DPRK from producing and proliferating nuclear weapons remains today the all-consuming focus of US policy toward Pyongyang. Pyongyang's history of "brinkmanship diplomacy" and its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, despite its stated commitments, to denuclearize, cause many observers to doubt that the regime will ever negotiate away its nuclear capability. To be a nuclear weapon state is a broader strategy of the DPRK's regime survival. North Korean leaders have to complement their revenues with aid from the outside world. They want outside aid without too many conditions. Brinkmanship and blackmail are the only alternatives for the regime's survival. Therefore, it seems that US sanctions on Pyongyang are appropriate in the short term to demonstrate the will of the international community to stem the spread of nuclear weapons and bring the DPRK back to the negotiating table. It needs close cooperation among the US, ROK, and Japan at a minimum, with China, Russia, and others preferably on board, to increase the costs involved in North Korea's possessing nuclear weapons.

But over the long term sanction will not bring about a positive change in North Korea's behavior toward other countries or its citizens. In particular, considering North Korea's record, Pyongyang is likely to transfer nuclear weapons technology to state or non-state actors[18]. Whether they are patterned after programs in China or Vietnam, any active programs for economic reform will be burdensome for the North because it is not equipped with the institutional tools or capability to deal with the resulting waves of change.

Economic sanctions against North Korea have been strengthened and extended in response to its nuclear and missile tests. However, those sanctions have not been made meaningful in "punishing" North Korea. Additionally, the more the international community tries to isolate this country, the more North Korea will depend on nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip. Sanctions alone will not create a lasting solution to the North Korean conundrum and must be complemented by other long-term strategic approaches. The long-term effect of sanctions has been to harden the DPRK's resistance to international cooperation and reinforce its isolation from the liberalizing influence of global

economic integration.

Strategic pessimists think that the DPRK will not abandon its nuclear program whatever outside pressure may inflict upon its regime. They think that North Korea already has nuclear weapons and its regime may handle international pressure skillfully in the future.

They believe that China and Russia covertly endorse North Korea's developing nuclear weapons to check the US expansion in Northeast Asia. The US attempts to persuade China to put pressure on North Korea to quit its nuclear weapons might be absurd. Because China may seemingly cooperate with the US and international community but it thinks that the ultimate responsibility to denuclearize North Korea is under the shoulder of the U.S. Moreover, China takes advantage of the situation to strengthen its national influence in Northeast Asia. Chinese policymakers may regard that a nuclear-armed DPRK seems to be a lesser evil than collapsing North Korea. Because Beijing needs to maintain internal stability and promote economic development. Concerns that an implosion of the North Korean regime or economic stress caused by stringent sanctions could send a flood of North Korean refugees across its shared border drive Beijing's opposition to stern reactions to North Korean provocations. Notwithstanding China's desire to serve as an honest broker, it keeps on seeking a close relationship with North Korea.

If there is a contingency situation in North Korea, it may help the North Korean Regime to sustain its power covertly to maintain stability around China's bordering zone. So far, at least, Beijing's conviction that pushing Pyongyang to the wall is counter-productive and likely to bring about chaos[19]. Strategic pessimists think that the DPRK's partial surrender of nukes might also be negotiable. To reduce the risks inherent in partial agreements, the United States should insist on significant, irreversible steps at the outset of any limited agreement. They believe that this may ensure substantial progress toward denuclearization and lessen the potential for derailment.

4. Conclusion

South Korea is the country that feels most threatened by North Korea's nuclear tests. The U.S. government is now remaining firm in its position that sanctions against the North will continue unless the North takes significant steps towards dismantling all its nuclear weapons development programs. For the smart power strategy, the South has to take a firm stance over the North's appeasement gesture with a principle while talking with them.

The failure of the United States to stop and now reverse the DPRK nuclear over the previous three decades threatens its hegemonic leadership in Northeast Asia and is linked to the decreasing ability of American power to shape events in other proliferation-prone regions such as South and West Asia. As time passes, the US's ability regarding deterrence and negotiation may decrease while the North's nuclear program may result in its possession of more nuclear weapons. A militarily muscular China with substantial international economic ties will be able to exercise considerable political power that could prompt U.S. friends and allies to make difficult choices, eroding U.S. influence around the world possibly including the North Korean nuclear issues. The US should not pull out its force in the Korean Peninsula under the sole condition of North Korea's giving up its nuclear strategy. Because North Korea has huge chemical and conventional weapons.

North Korea is likely to cause several future crises in Northeast Asia, by using WMD. What North Korea needs now is not to raise useless tensions, but to make a strategic decision to denuclearize. North Korea is now faced with a food shortage and economic chaos sparked by international economic sanctions under the Covid-19 pandemic. North Korea might have to try and overcome internal crises by creating external crises in the future as well. Therefore the US needs to pursue an engagement policy towards North Korea to solve the problem.

The Northeast Asian states may also suffer significant damage if they do not fully prepare for the contingency[20]. Such close trilateral cooperation is now needed given the DPRK's ability to cause great damage. Although the United States, China, and South Korea share a strong interest in developing mutual understandings on responding to North Korea, some gaps in priorities suggest consi-

derable points of potential conflict in US-China-ROK-Japan coordination in a crisis scenario. Seoul primarily wants to avoid sudden regime collapse in the North but is also cautious to limit direct intervention by China and the United States despite South Korea's lack of capacity to solely manage large-scale North Korean instability. The US would support South Korean efforts in crisis management with its military forces. The US, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China should maintain a tight grip on U.N. Sanctions so that Kim Jong Un has no choice but to step forward onto the international stage.

China would want to avoid the economic and regional security implications of instability in North Korea but also has a strategic interest in restricting US-led intervention. If North Korea collapses, there would be little chance of preventing the hemorrhaging of dangerous technology and fissile materials into the terrorist groups. Aside from posing a political, security, economic and humanitarian nightmare for East Asia, the collapse could trigger a confrontation between Beijing and Washington as each moves to protect its interests on the Peninsula. If North Korea collapses violently and sends thousands of refugees fleeing into Northeast China, Beijing might send troops into the country to restore order over the objections of South Korea and the United States[21]. To date, there has been no US-China-ROK-Japan discussion at any level on managing instability in North Korea.

The end of the Kim dynasty will create an atmosphere of a different approach. Therefore, for the long term, while talking with North Korea, Washington, Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo have to prepare for contingencies of the DPRK regime to tackle problems that may occur from various scenarios. Only continued vigilance and close collaboration and consistent sanctions by the UN and its member states will be able to contain North Korea. In the long and bumpy road of the peace process, the ROK has to use smart power to induce North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons by employing a tight link strategy among the ROK-DPRK-US triangle. The essential components of smart power are using alliances, partnerships, and institutions, etc. In this context, South Korea has all the necessary elements of the ROK-US alliance and ROK-China economic partnership, and 9/19 inter-Korean military agreement.

First, in terms of using alliance, South Korea has to call for the U.S to foster a peace regime building on the Korean Peninsula while cooperating with the Biden administration's democratic ideology. Second, in terms of using partnership, South Korea has to induce China to put pressure on the DPRK to abandon nuclear weapons. Third, in terms of using institutions, ROK and DPRK have to transform the current 9/19 inter-Korean military agreement of the initial operational arms control into systemic arms control through notification of mutual military training. In those processes, the South Korean government has to map out a creative roadmap by using a smart power strategy for the permanent peacebuilding and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the long and bumpy road of the peace regime building process, it needs strategic optimism in pushing ahead smart power strategies but in building defense posture, they need to be a strategic pessimist.

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6. Appendix

6.1. Authors contribution

Initial name		Contribution
Author	SL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Consideration of the Necessity of Coaching the Korean MILITARY in the Pandemic Era

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Abstract

Purpose: It is the era of talking about post-corona beyond the corona era. Corona is having a rapid impact on society as a whole. Many scholars predict that the pandemic will not stop as a single event, but will become daily life with a different name. With the rapid development of various media such as working from home and social media, it has become an era that requires more individual initiative. Coaching can be the most needed skill in this pandemic era. Social interest in coaching is also increasing. The pandemic is further increasing the need for coaching. In this paper, we look at the research trend of coaching in the times, and especially suggest implications for coaching research methods in the military.

Method: In order to understand the research trends in the field of coaching, this study searched for doctoral dissertations on the RISS site of the Korea Education and Research Information Service. As a result, papers from 1992 to January 2021 were searched. The reason for the study of the doctoral dissertation is that it was judged that targeting the research results of researchers who entered the academic field as official experts provides data on stable re-search trends. First, 489 doctoral dissertations were searched, and through content analysis, doctoral dissertations with "coaching" were selected and compressed into a total of 210. The 210 papers were categorized through content analysis. Trend analysis through content analysis has the advantage of being able to implicitly show the research trend of a specific discipline. Afterwards, the selected papers were classified by period, research field, and major re-search field, and the trend of research was analyzed.

Results: As a result of the analysis, the number of dissertations related to coaching has increased since '10, and exceeded 23 publications in '16. By research area, 53 in the field of education, 53 in the field of education, 40 in the field of sports, 37 in the field of business, 21 in general coaching, 23 in medicine, 18 in religion, 9 in public institutions, and 6 in career management. Was. The main research fields were 63 papers related to the ching program, 41 coaching leadership papers, 9 scale development papers, and 1 leadership coaching paper. In the case of public organizations, the number of papers decreases when compared to other fields, and in particular, military-related research was confirmed in three cases: coaching program development, effectiveness analysis, and coaching competency model development.

Conclusion: Coaching requires active research and application in the military as well as the private sector. To this end, future research is necessary to expand the quantitative expansion of military-related coaching, group coaching and group coaching, etc., research in connection with group coaching and organizational culture improvement, and development of a coaching program for all executives. Finally, through the development of a leadership coaching diagnostic tool that reflects the characteristics of each group, we measure the current level of leaders and propose research and development of educational programs.

[Keywords] Coaching, Military Coaching, Content Analysis, Meta Analysis, Public Institutions

1. Introduction

It is the era of post-corona beyond the era of COVID-19. Corona is having a rapid impact on society as a whole. Many scholars predict that the pandemic will not stop as a single event, but will become daily life with a different name. Jason Schenker(2020), in his book “The Post Corona World,” discusses the expansion of investment in education due to changes in education, the crisis of prestigious universities, and the expansion of investment in Edu-tech[1].

With the rapid development of various media such as telecommuting and social media, what is of concern is the polarization of education and economy. In the field of education, the initiative of individual students is also important, but information, economic power, and caregiver's interest are also important. Due to the corona, it is also important to secure learning tools such as computers when students learn on their own at home on the Internet, as well as the interest and management ability of teachers and primary caregivers who manage to allow students to study voluntarily[2][3][4].

Not only the education of school-age students, but also the number of office workers who have to manage their own work quantity and quality without a manager due to the vitalization of working from home is increasing rapidly[5]. The activation of non-face-to-face work and telecommuting also requires a change in the focus and method of leadership in the organization[6]. In 2017, IBM abolished telecommuting, which reached 40% in 24 years. The reason is that working in the office was an effective choice over working from home for an innovative and creative work environment. However, due to the corona, these changes have returned to the situation where they are forced to work from home and non-face-to-face work. Leaders in the era of Corona must act as the right role model and maintain online and offline contacts[7]. In the background, even if they are evaluated as a result of their work, there is a concern that work productivity will decrease as time passes in the case of office workers who do not demonstrate self-leadership well.

Many people are in stressful situations due to the coronavirus. The level of stress varies from person to person, and the form of coping with it varies[8]. Shin Kwang-cheol(2010) said that “online lectures” at universities in the post-corona era are no longer a simple matter of choice. He insisted on changing the direction of education from 'teaching' to 'learning' and further to 'coaching' [9].

Due to the corona, it has become an era of coaching that requires more individual initiative. Coaching can be the most needed skill in this pandemic era. 93% of the top 1000 companies in the U.S. practice manager coaching because coaching is showing practical effects in the business field[10].

Interest in coaching is also increasing in our military. Coaching education in the military began as part of the development of the leadership competency of military leaders, and initially began as a form of 2 to 3 hours of education. Currently, in the name of leadership coaching in all military units, it is spreading with on-site coaching for 4-5 days and non-face-to-face coaching for 6-10 weeks for military leaders.

This study aims to present implications for the direction of coaching research in the military, a public organization that is now applying coaching in earnest through the analysis of previous research related to coaching while preparing for the post-corona era.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1. The concept of coaching


ICF defines coaching as partnering with clients in a thought-provoking and creative process that inspires them to maximize their personal and professional potential. The term Coach comes from the horse-drawn buggy in the 16th century Hungarian city of Kocs. Coaching is often compared to trains and wagons to explain coaching. The main difference is that the destination of the train is determined, whereas wagons allow the person riding the wagon to decide their destination and change the destination in the process of moving[11].

From a functional point of view, tutors were sometimes referred to as coaches at British universities in 1840. In particular, the term coach began to be used in the sports field in 1880, when a person who instructed a college student rowing on the Thames in Cambridge was called a coach. As a modern concept, the term coaching began in 1971 when Timothy Galway, captain of Harvard's tennis club, taught people to play tennis. He found that people learn easily and enjoyably by focusing their consciousness on the potential in their clients rather than teaching them technical methods[11].

He named this educational method inner game and used it to teach various fields of sports. In the early 1980s, John Whitmore applied these principles to business and wrote a book called "Coaching for Performance." In business administration, on the other hand, in business administration, many people applied 1:1 individual intervention that started with organizational development and what we now call organizational development from the 1940s to the 1960s. Before the term 'coach' became widespread, people were already practicing what we call coaching today[12].

Coaching is a distinct point from counseling, mentoring, teaching, consulting, and facilitation expressed in similar areas[13]. Coaching is about helping customers set and achieve their own goals. Counseling generally plays the role of analyzing the causes of events that have occurred in the past and returning the current state to the normal category. In the case of consulting, an expert analyzes the organization, diagnoses it, and suggests a solution, but its acceptance depends on the organization. Coaching focuses on the future rather than the past and believes in finding solutions on its own, where the coach acts as a helping partner on an equal footing with the client[11] <Figure 1>.

Figure 1. Relationship between coaching and other domain.



There are three philosophy of coaching. First, there are endless potentials for everyone. Second, the answer you need lies in that person. Third, in order to find an answer, partnership with someone is effective. In other words, in coaching, humans are basically viewed as beings that are intact, have answers, and are creative[14].

This concept of coaching seems to be particularly suitable for the Corona era. As non-face-to-face contact becomes more common and more time spent alone or on a small scale, individual initiative is becoming more important than ever. Motivation occurs more easily when physical contact with others increases, but when non-face-to-face contact increases, you must motivate yourself. Therefore, it is important to have the ability to accurately set one's goals through coaching and to self-check whether you are systematically trying to achieve your goals. In this case, self-coaching or coaching will be effective[15].

2.2. Characteristics of the military as a public organization

Many scholars have discussed the difference between public and private organizations, and these theoretical arguments have been put together in the form of the theory of characteristics of public organizations by scholars centered on Hal Rainey. The differences between public and private organizations studied by Jeon Young-han(2009) are as follows[16].

Table 1. Differences between public and public organizations.

Division	Private organization	Public organization
Organizational environment	The existence of a market for trading organizational output	No market for trading organizational output
Organizational goals	Clear goal	Ambiguity , diversity , limiting the measurement of target achievement
Organizational structure	Flexible and flexible organizational structure	Rules and strong hierarchy strict
Job attitude	Various levels of job satisfaction and organizational commitment	Relatively low level of job satisfaction and organizational commitment
Motivation	Motivation by external factors	Motivation by intrinsic incentives
Leadership	Various according to organizational characteristics	External environment is important for political support
Organizational change	Flexible organizational change	Relatively difficult organizational change

In summary, compared to private organizations, public organizations are characterized by lack of market exposure, ambiguity of organizational goals, strict administrative processing and execution, constraints on leadership, the need to manage internal and external related organizations, and difficulties in innovation because they are operated with public funds.

What public management theorists pay attention to as the most important environmental difference between public-private organizations is that unlike private organizations, most public organizations do not have a market to trade their outputs[16]. In private organizations, decision-making within the organization has a direct impact on cost reduction, management efficiency, and performance improvement. In addition, it can be expressed visually in terms of production volume and sales. However, it is difficult for public organizations, including the military, to measure clear output. Military personnel are diverse and enormous, and the budget is obtained according to government policies, so it takes a long time to innovate quickly.

Comparing military organizations and general social organizations, missions, scales, and system configurations have unique characteristics. The military organization aims to protect national security, which is a vital interest by constructing, maintaining, and operating a special group called the military. To this end, war is restrained and prepared, and these activities are likely to be perceived as a consumer group that wastes the national budget if they are not aware of their importance in normal times. In addition, enormous budgets are required to build and maintain a military organization, and the military organization is a mixture of civilian and military, so its forms are diverse[17].

Regarding the characteristics of the military organization, Janowirz(1979) defined the military organization as a hierarchical combat group based on class, responsibility, and authori-

ty[18]. The characteristic of military organization is the absoluteness of completing the military mission. The defeat in the war puts the very existence of the state at risk. Second, it is the organization of the upper and lower command system by rank and position. Authority and responsibilities are assigned according to position and rank, and the roles and duties of members are clear. Third, the mission is performed based on the uncertainty, complexity and contingency of the battlefield situation as an essential characteristic of war. Fourth, it is the force and normativeness of the military organization. Considering the specificity of military missions and the characteristics of the battlefield environment, we can see the importance of command and control[19].

The military as a public organization has a number of specialties, but it is an organization that is run around people. This is why various management, leadership, and administrative theories in general society are practically used in the military. Considering the fact that the usefulness of coaching is increasing socially and human resource development is more important, it can be said that coaching is also necessary for the military as a public organization. In particular, considering the complex battlefield environment, it will be more useful through coaching to foster soldiers with leadership.

2.3. Military coaching status

In the case of military coaching, coaching for each group was educated in the form of a subject as a way to enhance the core competencies of leaders. In '13, the army started coaching for company commanders to prevent negative leadership, and is being expanded to target battalion commanders from '16 and division commanders from '18. After conducting coaching, the Army improved its leadership level by 5-10% as a result of effectiveness evaluation. This means that leadership coaching is positive for field commanders' leadership development[20][21]. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are conducting leadership coaching for commanders in accordance with the policy decisions of the Ministry of Defense. Leadership coaching defined by each group is as follows <Table 2>.

Table 2. Definition of leadership coaching for each military.

Division	Definition	Features and core
Department of defense	Leadership coaching is a system that helps to promote change and growth through self-awareness based on leadership level diagnosis and advice in order to enhance the leadership competency of field unit commanders.	Policy perspective leadership competency change and growth
Army	Flexible leadership coaching expert(instructor) provides coaching targets(leaders) with opportunities to reflect on their own by recognizing the difference in leadership level assessed by themselves and others, and systematically helping leaders to develop and grow their own leadership	Procedural perspective self-development and growth
Navy	An integrated process that helps the commander identify and accept differences in perceptions of the upper, lower, left, and right unit members about his or her leadership, and contribute to the development of his or her leadership capacity and a positive organizational culture as a Leader as coach.	Coach type leader organizational culture development
Air force	A series of processes that help commanders to contribute to the development of their leadership capabilities and a positive organizational culture by identifying differences in perceptions of the upper, lower, left, and right unit members about their leadership	Leadership competency organizational culture development

In summarizing the definitions, the status of each institution and the areas that each group focuses on show little differences. In the case of the Ministry of Defense, the leadership coaching system initiated by the Army was defined from a policy and institutional point of view to spread and operate the leadership coaching system to the entire military. In the case of the Army, emphasis was placed on the procedural aspects of leadership coaching currently in operation. The Navy focuses on coach-type leaders and organizational culture development,

while the Air Force pursues both leadership capability development and organizational culture development.

The military's essential goal of suppression and victory of war has a paradoxical character. It is a hierarchical group that requires strict discipline and obedience, and at the same time, considering the characteristics of war represented by contingency and uncertainty of complexity, it is essential to establish and apply creative operational plans by soldiers. Because things are difficult for anyone to predict on the battlefield, flexible decision-making by each combatant, including the leader, is required[19][22].

2.4. The need for military coaching

The necessity of coaching in military organizations is as follows. First, it is necessary to develop human resources more proactively and creatively than ever before, according to the reduction of military force. The voluntary and self-management of military personnel is required due to the nature of the military that requires strict discipline and creative battles. Our military can cultivate these leaders through coaching, and when leaders demonstrate coaching-type leadership, these talents can be nurtured[23][24].

Second, coaching is necessary for the development of military organizational culture. Coaching is being evaluated as an effective way to change the perception system of members of the organization[25]. The role of the leader in the military is very important. However, in a situation where the desire for a horizontal organizational culture is increasing and creative problem solving is important, it becomes increasingly difficult to change the organization alone. Therefore, coaching can lead to actual organizational culture change by coaching not only with the leader but also with the members.

Third, coaching can be effective in maximizing the potential of new generation soldiers. In recent years, leadership is changing its perspective from a vertical relationship that exerts influence to a horizontal partnership, a form that enhances the motivation of members of the organization and supports the achievement of their goals[26]. Soldiers enlisted recently are demanding respect for character in a horizontal relationship as citizens in military uniforms[21].

Finally, it can provide military commanders with opportunities for reflection and insight[16]. Unlike general organizations, military leaders have no choice but to nurture them from beginners to advanced leaders through long-term experience and education, except for a few special branches such as military religious affairs, military legal affairs, and military doctor. Therefore, military executives who will be serving long-term services should be nurtured into advanced leaders through coaching. If you reflect the coaching philosophy of coaching's holistic, creative, and resourceful skills, you will be able to foster excellent leaders[27][28].

3. Research Method


In order to understand the research trends in the field of coaching, this study searched for doctoral dissertations on the RISS site of the Korea Education and Research Information Service. As a result, papers from 1992 to January 2021 were searched. The reason for the study of the doctoral dissertation is that it was judged that targeting the research results of researchers who entered the academic field as official experts provides data on stable research trends.

First, 489 doctoral dissertations were searched, and through content analysis, doctoral dissertations with "coaching" were selected and compressed into a total of 210. The 210 papers were categorized through content analysis. Trend analysis through content analysis has the advantage of being able to implicitly show the research trend of a specific discipline. Afterwards, the selected papers were classified by period, research field, and major research field, and the trend of research was analyzed.

4. Analysis of Research Results

For the doctoral degree with the subject word of coaching, one or two papers were published every year for almost 15 years from '92 to '08. 'As the number of papers started to increase from 10 years, it exceeded 23 publications in '16. Between '18 and '19, the volume increased to 29 each <Figure 2>.

Figure 2. Present status of doctoral thesis by year.



The results of reviewing the published thesis by research field are: 53 in education, 40 in sports, 37 in business, 21 in coaching, 23 in medical care, 18 in religion, 9 in public institutions, and career managers. It was in order of 6 episodes. Among them, coaching general is coaching theory, verification of the effectiveness of coaching leadership, and research on coaches themselves. Three out of nine public institutions were military-related papers <Table 3>.


Table 3. Current status by research field.

Year	Career	Public institutions	Education	Enterprise	Services , agriculture	Sports	Medical treatment	Religion	Coaching general	Total
Total	6	9	53	37	3	40	23	18	21	210
Ratio	2.9	4.3	25.2	17.6	1.4	19.0	11.0	8.6	10.0	100

The field with the largest number of theses is the field of education. The reason coaching is active is the result of showing that the coaching method is effective in allowing students to study on their own in connection with self-directed learning[3]. The sports field is a field where modern coaching has begun and is being studied continuously. In the corporate field, starting with executive coaching, research has been continuously conducted in connection with team coaching, group coaching, and the spread of coaching organizational culture[29].

By major research subject, there were 63 papers related to coaching programs, 41 coaching leadership papers, 9 scale development papers, and 1 leadership coaching paper. Thesis related to coaching program development and effectiveness verification has been active since 2013, and research continues until recently. Thesis related to coaching leadership is constantly increasing, showing that coaching is expanding to the field of organization management. The scale development thesis shows that research has been active since '19, and research on scientific verification of coaching is active. One study on leadership coaching was published in 2020.

Figure 2. Current status by major research field.



In the case of public organizations, the number of papers is lower compared to other fields. This shows that interest in coaching is weak due to the nature of the public sector where it is difficult to present tangible goals such as productivity and profit pursuit. In particular, there are three studies related to coaching in the military, which are the development of coaching programs and research on effectiveness. Lee Dae-gyeom(2016) developed a coaching program for naval sergeants, Lim gye-hwan(2016) analyzed the effectiveness of coaching and directing leadership for platoon-level units of the Marine Corps, and Lee Yong-kweon(2019) on the development of a military leader's coaching competency model and educational needs. Studied. This shows that more research on coaching related to public organizations, especially military, is needed in the field of coaching.

5. Conclusion and Implications

In the early days, the trend of coaching-related research was mainly focused on educational program development thesis by emphasizing the practicality of coaching. In recent years, more elaborate research is underway with the development of the scale. As the research on coaching leadership that links leadership and coaching is increasing, it can be seen that the importance of coaching as a part of leadership in an organization is increasing. It can be said that the field of coaching shows the trend of developing from a practical field to a more systematic discipline.

There is a need to expand research related to coaching in public organizations. If coaching is activated in public organizations that affect the people's life as a whole, it will play a role in improving the quality of life of the people and raising policy satisfaction.

In particular, considering the military's mission characteristics and the importance of leadership, I would like to propose several research directions in the military. First, it is necessary to expand military-related coaching research. Considering the philosophy of coaching, the influence of coaching in the county where life and death are together is enormous. If the number of studies proving the effectiveness of coaching in the military increases in quantity, it will help to spread the coaching culture in the military. Second, research and effectiveness verification for groups such as group coaching and team coaching. Currently, leadership coaching for one leader is the mainstream. Considering the characteristics of the group acting as a group, research on the group is needed. Third, it is a study that links coaching within the county and organizational culture improvement. The improvement of the organizational culture will in-

crease its effectiveness when targeting members of the organization together with leaders. This is because in order to achieve the organizational goals according to the vision of the organization, the direction of the leader and the direction of the members of the organization must be aligned to double the effect. Fourth, it is necessary to develop a coaching program for all executives. If they return to society based on their self-coaching and coaching experience in the military, our society will be able to develop into a mature society made up of citizens with more initiative and responsibility. Finally, it is suggested that the development of a leadership coaching diagnostic tool that reflects the characteristics of each group, measures the current level of coaching of leaders, and develops an education program that can develop it.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	SY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Competition for TECHNOLOGY HEGEMONY between the U.S. and China from a Geopolitical Point of View

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Abstract

Purpose: The hegemony competition between the United States and China is one of the most crucial topics of world politics in the 21st century. As China's innovation in science, technology, and high-tech industries grow rapidly, the United States is enacting restrictions to regulate this critical situation. This paper searched for the motives for their political actions, the primary differences between the U.S.-China competition for technological hegemony, and their national policies.

Method: This paper examined the differences in U.S.-China national policies through geopolitics. The usefulness of geopolitics, the characteristics of continental and maritime countries, and the Huawei incident which clearly indicates the cross-section of the U.S.-China technological competition, these factors were analyzed to find the answer to the research question.

Results: The contrast in technology competition and technology policies between the U.S. and China can be summarized as a difference in culture and perception. The difference comes from China's 'Confucian and family like discussion' and America's 'individualistic, bottom-up, and democratic' lifestyle. In addition, the Huawei issue is a conflict of economic ideology between the United States and China with regards to the relationship between business and state.

Conclusion: The difference in policy between the U.S. and China can be defined as a difference in basic culture and perception. Therefore if the main reason that the United States suspects Huawei comes from the aforementioned fundamental differences in national thought, this could not only be a problem that is difficult to solve, but also a starting point of a dispute that could continue to be a problem in the future.

[Keywords] Geopolitics, Huawei, Continental Nation, Maritime Nation, Technology Competition

1. Introduction

The hegemony competition between the United States and China is an important topic of world politics in the 21st century. especially since the United States is implementing sanctions against China for its rapidly growing technological innovations and high-tech industries. The United States believes that the main reason for China's rapid growth is because of illegal activities such as stealing intellectual property rights from foreign companies, and theft of technology transfers. The U.S. identifies China's actions as a threat to its own economy and security, hence sanctioned China by giving legal sanctions to prevent technology leakage, thereby intensifying the technology competition between the U.S. and China. However, the key reason China has achieved rapid growth is because of its government-led massive R&D investment and full support for corporate activities. While in the U.S. R&D and investment activities are mainly driven by companies. Then where does the difference in government policy come from? This paper uses geopolitics to examine the differences in policies that

shape the technological competition between the U.S. and China i.e. policy motives and backgrounds.

2. Geopolitics Theory and Characteristics of Continental and Maritime States

2.1. The effectiveness of geopolitical theory

Research regarding the hegemony in international politics have been discussed by the Hegemonic Stability Theory and the Power Transition Theory. According to the Hegemonic stability theory, when a hegemony state dominates the world, the international political and economic order is stabilized[1]. and according to Power transition theory, If The gap between the superpower and the second-power become narrow, conflicts and wars may arise, and eventually the hegemony will be replaced[2].

Although these theories do not fully explain the answer "why", they explain the question "How" instead. Geopolitics can be used as a method of reinterpreting today's globalization, regionalism, and culture[3]. It is a powerful tool that can connect and explain actors, perspectives, and policies in the real world's domestic, foreign politics and international security[4]. It can provide a useful framework to analyze the dynamics and tendencies of competition for hegemony.

Geopolitics does not analyze how people or states behave, but why states decide on such policies. In other words, in geopolitics, the state is not an artificial thing made of territories and citizens, but an instinctive object of nature, whose characteristics are determined based by its natural environment[5]. Geopolitics is an important tool in international politics and can be the most effective analytical method or formal system in determining foreign policy through the interaction of material capabilities, ideas, and institutions[6].

2.2. The characteristics of a maritime state

The main characteristic of a maritime state is a nation that borders the sea and is characterized by water, which is contrary to that of a continental state that has characteristics of land. According to Rachel, "the endless horizons have given great features of bodness, perseverance, and ambition to the spirit and individuality of the maritime people[7]." However, the size of the territory of a maritime country has fundamental limitations such as its lack of living space and resources because of a dense population. Limited territories allow the maritime state to have a macroscopic and wider view rather than settling with the given environment. Their accessibility to the open sea paved the way for activities such as opening up new ports and trade routes. Therefore maritime state's people have a flexible life based on commercialism, such as trade and manufacturing, rather than settling in an area and living as a group[8]. Due to the nature of the sea, individuals who are more flexible are respected in maritime countries, and thus ethical and legal standards are more relative and flexible than continental countries.

2.3. The characteristics of continental states

Continental countries that use land as basic living spaces have been affected by their spatial fixedness and their non-changing solid nature. The interior of a continental state is formed by a wide stretch of land, therefore political expansion and migration were easy, but the borders were easily exposed to enemies due to frequent invasion and attacks from neighboring enemies[9]. The absence of natural barriers led to anxiety in the bordering areas, which led to many continental countries creating an empire to stabilize the border. In this process, the continental countries had to integrate the vast space, cultures and identities into one national identity, and for this, a centralized political system was formed. In other words, all the qualities needed to effectively integrate geopolitical space, namely his-

torical will, unity, and mission to civilization, are expressed in continental characteristics. Continental countries are interested in forming large groups, such as families, races, ethnicities, nations, and empires. In terms of how they run a civilization, they have a stubborn nature in ethics, social traditions, characterizing settlement, conservative tendencies, and strict legal discipline. Most of the continental countries settled in a single area, established agriculture as their main business, and had a strong tendency of collectivism and hierarchies, which often resulted in a dictatorship political system. Continental idealisms developed eventually with submissiveness towards dictatorship, and collectivism have both emerged from it[10].

3. China's Economic Growth and the United States Policy Against China

3.1. China's innovation in science and technology and the development of advanced industries

From the Mao Zedong era to the Xi Jinping era, China has continuously pursued “science and technology innovation” through government support and deregulation to achieve significant growth. China is striving for the growth of their manufacturing and high-tech industries through the “Made in China 2025” and “Internet Plus Policy” initiatives as it seeks to be at the forefront of the 4th Industrial Revolution. China is pushing for industrial advancement over the next 30 years in three stages, through the "China Manufacturing 2025" initiative with the main goal of "enhancing manufacturing economic power through the convergence of existing manufacturing and the Internet." every 10 years. As shown in the following <Table 1>.

Table 1. China Manufacturing 2025[11].

Phase 1(2015 - 2025)	Phase 2(2025 - 2035)	Phase 3(2035 - 2049)
Entry into the group of advanced manufacturing countries (U.K., France, Korea standards)	Leap into the mid-level within the group of advanced manufacturing countries (Germany, Japan standards)	Achieve leading status within the group of advanced manufacturing countries (above the United States in 2049)

Since the announcement of the “Made in China 2025” policy, China has been constantly growing and showing remarkable results in next-generation communication technologies, new energy vehicles, and robots(Drones). China is striving to improve its industrial structure by integrating the traditional manufacturing industry with the internet platforms through the “Internet Plus Policy”. The Internet Plus policy encourages rapid growth of the digital economy and accelerates the establishment of wired and wireless platforms. With this, the number of wired and wireless communication network users in China is expanding to the world's largest, overtaking the U.S. and EU.

China continues to invest and support the field of science and technology to be recognized as an innovative country. It is achieving its desired results because of a strategy that revolves around technology and high-tech industries. To expound its capabilities even further, the personal information of 1.4 billion Chinese people are used as readily available data[12]. China's research and development investment is the world's second-largest after the United States with a total research and development cost of 1.76 trillion Yuan(259.745 trillion Won) in 2017, achieving 2.13 percent of GDP as of 2019. 48,882 international patents were issued, which makes China second in the world after the United States, and 26,000 international papers were published in 2018, making China the world's number one, even above the United States. Additionally, the number of graduates from science and engineering colleges in China is the world's number one(4.7 million), which is overwhelmingly higher

than the second place India(2.6 million) and the third place United States(568,000). China is achieving significant growth through government support and deregulation.

3.2. United states policy to surpress the growth of china's science and technology

The United States believes that China's technological innovation and rapid growth of high-tech industries are due to illegal activities led by the Chinese government such as stealing intellectual property rights and forcing technology transfers. The US recognizes China's infringement of intellectual property rights as a threat to its own economy and security, hence it is sanctioning China through any possible means, including legal sanctions to prevent technology leakage. The U.S. Department of Commerce announced in May 2019 that Huawei and 68 affiliates were declared as restricted trading companies and that U.S. companies must obtain government permission to trade with Huawei. Later on Google, Intel, Qualcomm, and Panasonic of Japan declared suspension of trading with Huawei. The United States also enforced sanctions on "Made in China 2025" related Chinese science and technology researchers, and university students by limiting their visa in the U.S. to just one year[13]. The goal of the United States is to change China's 2025 policy[14], or in other words, it is trying to suppress China's threat of achieving technology hegemony. The main point though is that the US policy of deterring the growth of China will be prolonged.

3.3. United states sanctions on huawei

Huawei is one of the symbols of China's information and communication technology development. Currently, Huawei's smartphones are gaining popularity not only in China but also around the world. Huawei's telecommunication equipment market share is the world's number one and its smartphone market share is the world's second largest. As a matter of fact, one in three people in the world uses Huawei's equipment. Huawei has a competitive advantage because of its superior technology compared to its price, or in other words its cost-effectiveness. Not only is Huawei influential in the development of the next generation 5G, but it also known to be 20 to 30% cheaper than its competitors while having technology that is estimated to be three to six months ahead of its competitors.

The controversy over Huawei began in the early 2000s over intellectual property infringement between U.S. telecommunications companies. In 2003, United States telecommunications company Cisco sued Huawei for intellectual property infringement, and in 2017, United States telecommunications company T-Mobile USA sued Huawei for stealing the intellectual property rights and design of its phone experimental robot 'Tappy '. The U.S. officially filed a lawsuit against China's copyright violation with the WTO in March 2018, saying that the biggest reason for Huawei's sanctions was an infringement of intellectual property rights. The United States argues that cyber security breaches including copyright violations of copies distributed in China and violations of industrial property rights(patent rights, trademark rights, etc.) in the high-tech electronics industry are serious[15][16].

Some worry that the Huawei crisis is a short-sighted measure since it is only one of thousands of Chinese companies that may be stealing technology and intellectual properties[17], but some see this as a means necessary for protecting United States intellectual property rights and maintaining technological hegemony to keep the "Made in China 2025" at bay[18]. The U.S. says it will no longer tolerate the infringement of its intellectual property rights and its security of telecommunications equipment, the main reason is because China could emerge as a real threat to the U.S. in the high-tech sector. The United States is pressuring China with various measures such as expanding its investigation into Chinese spies and hackers[19], tightening export control, and imposing financial sanctions against Chinese companies.

4. Conclusion

The most important law in geopolitics is dualism which is expressed as the confrontation between maritime and continental forces. This can also be summarized as the confrontation between democracy centered on trade civilization and ideocracy centered on military power. The development of advanced technologies and the expansion of trade space have expanded beyond spatial factors of technological hegemony. Basically, it can be pointed out that the Huawei crisis started from a fundamental difference in economic ideology between the United States and China, where the root stems from the relationship between business and state. These differences in politics, economy, and society can be analyzed from a geopolitical perspective. To elaborate further, the natural environment of geopolitics is based on human history, values and lifestyles which affects the different institutions, military strategy and economic thought. The dualistic characteristics of countries based on geographical factors can be attributed to the property of 'solid' for land and 'liquid' for the ocean.

Therefore we can affirm that the economic ideology of the two countries is clearly separated. During the peak of the Enlightenment era at the end of the 18th century, the United States established a government based on the idea that the power of the state is based on the right of individual freedom. Uniquely, it is the first in the world that private corporations have the same basic rights as individuals. It also means that the government must recognize the economic and private freedoms of a private enterprises within the Constitution. The distinction between countries and private enterprise behaviour is therefore clearly defined. In the United States today, Americans believe that the division of government and private companies is the foundation of economic development. This is evident in the neoliberal economic reforms that have been around since the 1980s, namely deregulation and tax cuts[20].

On the other hand, China has a socialist mindset where the government can intervene in the activities of private companies for the sake of the national interest. In a socialist state, the government owns all of the state's assets, and the distinction between politics and economy is thus vague. It is important to pay close attention to the contents of the constitution revised in March 2018, as it mentions the "Chinese Characteristic Socialist Idea for a New Era(2012)", where the Xi Jinping administration claims its leadership is the most essential characteristic for Chinese-specific socialism. Following Marx's and Lenin's socialist ideas, China is still pursuing absolute economic power of the state, or in other words a setting where "the Communist Party of China has command of everything that happens in China," which clearly contradicts the liberal concept of the United States. Under these laws, the CCP can justify actions such as kidnapping or arresting Chinese businessmen at any time if they are not faithful to the Communist Party of China and their national interests.

In conclusion, the difference between the U.S. and China stems from basic culture and perception. Specifically, China's Confucian and family like top-down life and the U.S. individualist, bottom-up, and democratic lifestyle. Thus, the competition for technological hegemony between the U.S. and China may not be a problem that can be solved simply through negotiations. Therefore if the main reason the United States suspects Huawei comes from the aforementioned fundamental differences in national thought, this could not only be a problem that is difficult to solve, but also a starting point of a dispute that could continue to be a problem in the future.

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6. Appendix

6.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	JK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	YI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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A Study on the Performance Analysis of MILITARY Culture Innovation

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Abstract

Purpose: This study was conducted to evaluate and analyze whether the military culture innovation, which has been being promoted since 2014, is doing well through a survey of Army soldiers on "A Survey on the Feelings of Military Culture Innovation." In particular, a qualitative performance analysis of military culture innovation was conducted through a survey on the awareness and satisfaction of soldiers who are experiencing military culture innovation in personally.

Method: In this work, we selected suitable questions for the study through factor analysis of the SPSS program and conducted the study in two main ways on selected questions. The first is to conduct an analysis of the performance of military culture innovation through the average of the selected detailed questions for each part on the five implementations of military culture innovation. Second, we divided the officers and soldiers among the survey respondents to see if the results of their survey on the level of military culture innovation showed a difference, and analyzed whether the difference was significant through the SPSS program's independent sample T test.

Results: The results of the analysis conducted using selected questions through factor analysis are as follows: First, as a result of the analysis of the feeling of military culture innovation, we produced positive results that we are "somewhat satisfied" with all five implementations. Second, there was a significant difference between the officer group and the soldier group in terms of the sense of military culture innovation.

Conclusion: This study was conducted using the most survey results among the performance analysis of military culture innovation that has ever been done, so the reliability is very high. In addition, it is of great value in that it analyzed quality performance based on the feelings and thoughts of soldiers who are experiencing military culture innovation directly, not performance analysis relying on quantitative results. Through this, we hope that it will help to accurately diagnose the current military culture innovation and find constructive improvements in the future.

[Keywords] Performance, Military Culture, Innovation, Barracks, Achievements

1. Introduction

This study is based on the results of a survey on the feeling of military culture innovation, which analyzes the achievements of military culture innovation currently being pursued. The military culture innovation, which has been promoted for about a decade since 2005, has not only been too broad but also failed to achieve results in terms of long-term effectiveness because it was part of follow-up measures to deal with large-scale accidents. However, as large and small incidents and various accidents within military organizations continued to occur, the need for fundamental and practical discussions on military culture innovation gradually increased. The government, which felt the seriousness of the incident immediately

after the shooting of the 22nd Division(Lim Byeong-jang) and the assault and death of the 28th Division(Yoon Il-byung) in 2014, organized a civilian, government, and military culture innovation committee to the Ministry of National Defense. The main tasks are to create a service environment that can focus on military service with confidence through sound and safe barracks, to overcome the closeness of military life and to create a productive military service environment, and to create a strong army of comradeship[1].

Fourth, it was suggested to create a strong barracks where autonomy and responsibility were harmonized, and lastly, a strong barracks where discipline was established to train elite agents and establish military behavior and discipline.

Prior to 2014, military culture innovation was dealt with large-scale incidents and accidents, and there was a lot of controversy in terms of effectiveness and sustainability. However, the military culture innovation, which has been under way since 2014, is essentially approaching issues such as understanding the fundamental characteristics of the new generation at a pan-government level in order to overcome these limitations. In addition, by actively and continuously verifying effectiveness through pilot operation and interim evaluation of various innovative measures, it is clearly different from previous military culture innovation and has positive results when analyzing objective indicators.

The results of the Military Culture Innovation Promotion Evaluation Conference show quantitative results centered on short-term results of the Military Culture Innovation promoted since 2014. However, in this study, we tried to analyze the qualitative performance of military personnel who directly experience military culture innovation by going beyond quantitative performance. Under the current situation where only quantitative achievements on military cultural innovation are mentioned about the effectiveness of innovation, analyzing the internal performance of military personnel in terms of feeling and perception is expected to have great significance. Through this, it is expected to have a positive impact on seeking a developmental direction in the future by producing objective interim results on the innovation of the barracks culture and logically drawing areas that need to be further developed and supplemented[2][3][4][5].

This study was conducted to evaluate and analyze the military culture innovation in various aspects based on the 2nd survey results of the Military Culture Innovation Survey. Even considering that the survey period is about two years, the survey response rate of this figure guaranteed a reliability close to a full survey. Despite the difficulties of large-scale surveys due to the nature of the group, it was possible to produce very valuable survey results and to obtain accurate and specific analysis results by conducting analysis based on them. These analyses have also enabled the presentation of realistic and constructive improvements[6][7].

2. Theoretical Background

This study is an analysis of the intermediate achievements of military culture innovation, which has been in progress since 2014, and examined the progress of barracks culture innovation since 2014 to see if the details of military culture innovation meet the characteristics of the new generation. In addition, Yoon(2015) introduced the process of promoting military culture innovation, which began as part of defense reform, and specifically addressed the limitations in his research on defense culture formation[8]. In addition, Won(2016) conducted a study focusing on "new generation" soldiers in recognition of their military service and military life, and sought to find out their thoughts by questioning what the new generation soldiers were afraid of, curious about, and what they felt uncomfortable and wanted. Through this, we considered how the military organization could ultimately harmonize with the characteristics of the new generation without compromising its essence[9]. Meanwhile, Kim(2017) proposed to promote the innovation of the military culture in the era of the 4th

Industrial Revolution to curb negative motifs by promoting the cultural value of 'collective intelligence', a positive motif of the 4th Industrial Revolution[10]. To this end, by creating a variety of community environments that can create "collective intelligence" in terms of methodology, it imprints a positive image of military service as a "worthy time" for soldiers and emphasizes the creation of conditions to establish their identity during service. Taking this into consideration, we could see the characteristics of the new generation's achievement-oriented and active behavior when conditions were created. Considering the basic perceptions and thoughts of the soldiers in military service, we evaluated the path forward to the 4th Industrial Revolution[11][12].

3. Research Method

The survey was conducted by Army soldiers, as part of an interim assessment of the military culture innovation being pursued since 2014. The government-led military culture innovation began in 2014, and the civilian, government, and military culture innovation committees were formed. A large number of survey respondents complemented the inherent limitations of the sample survey and ultimately contributed to demonstrating the validity of the results derived from this study by increasing the confidence in the survey results.

The survey is largely divided into six parts. First of all, in the general section, questions about the basic personal investigation of survey respondents and the overall satisfaction of five implementations of military culture innovation are organized. The second part to the sixth part consists of a detailed questionnaire divided into five parts, ranging from "building a sound and safe barracks" to "building a strong barracks with established discipline." The five-point scale questions allowed more abstract variables of sensitivity and satisfaction to be quantified, and the subjective questions were used to specifically ask individual opinions, such as complementary points.

The survey on the 'feeling of military culture innovation' used in this study consists of a total of 60 questions, including a comprehensive question on the promotion of military culture innovation and five detailed questions on the main contents of the promotion. The number of questions per part was eight general parts, eight "healthy and safe barracks creation," nine "communicating with society," 13 "creating a barracks that guarantees human rights," nine "creating a barracks where autonomy and responsibility are harmonized," and 13 "strong barracks with established discipline."

The factor analysis of the SPSS program showed that the standard formation adequacy Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin(KMO) measurement was 0.989, indicating that the variables for factor analysis were fairly good, and Bartlett's spherical test determined that the use of factor analysis was appropriate and there were common factors. In addition, initial values for each variable and commonality extraction values by principal component analysis are presented. If the commonality, the ratio described by the factors extracted here, is less than 0.4 then it is excluded from the factor analysis, because all the commonality of each variable is greater than 0.4 and there is no question excluded from this process.

Table 1. Test results from KMO and bartlett.

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measurement of standard formation adequacy		0.989
Bartlett's spherical test	Approximate chi-square	2830001.263
	Degrees of freedom	780
	Significant probability	0

Finally, the rotated compositional matrix confirmed that the highly correlated questions

were grouped together. We compared whether the grouped questions belong to the same part and excluded the questions within the same part from the study that are not grouped by the same factor.

This study was based on the results of a survey on Army personnel's feelings and perceptions of military culture innovation, so it was able to supplement the short-term outcome-oriented performance analysis presented through the innovation evaluation meeting. Therefore, this study focused on performing qualitative performance analysis based on the results of the survey and intended to analyze the inner things, such as the satisfaction and thoughts or causes of the soldiers, rather than the ostensible performance analysis.

To this end, the government first analyzed the average of the response results of each part's detailed questions on the five promotional contents of the barracks culture innovation to find out if the part is doing well. We also looked at what the difference means by comparing the average of the detailed question responses by part and the overall satisfaction score by part in the general part. The second analysis was conducted in the same way as the first analysis, with the results of the soldiers and officers of the survey respondents divided separately by class. The average comparison of the difference between the soldier group and the officer group on the sense and perception of military cultural innovation was conducted, and the difference was significant through the independent sample T test of the SPSS program.

4. Research Results

The average of the eight questions selected in the "healthy and stable barracks creation" part was 2.1019, and the average of the three selected questions in the second "open barracks for communication with society" part was 2.0125. Third, the average of the 10 questions of the "creation of human rights-guaranteed barracks" part was 2.0529, and the fourth, the average of the seven questions of the "creation of barracks in harmony with autonomy and responsibility" part was 2.1330, and lastly, the average of the six questions was 1.9536. The average of the survey results for the five promotional activities in the barracks was between 1.95 and 2.13, and considering that two points in the five-point questionnaire meant 'somewhat helpful' and 'somewhat yes', the soldiers felt positive about the five promotion. In addition, the best performing parts, or the lowest average, were the 'strongest barracks with established discipline' part, and among the detailed questions, the highest average were 'Is my unit a disciplined unit?' 'Is my unit a safe unit without sexual violence?' and 'Are you ready to fight the North Korean army?'. According to the analysis of the question, the military has been a male-centered organization, and discrimination and sexual violence against women have been rampant. However, efforts have been made recently to eradicate irregularities such as thorough identification and strict punishment. The survey also showed that soldiers have fully internalized these values as a result of their constant efforts to educate and realize the army's vision and goals of "strong and advanced elite army to fight and beat the North Korean army." Together with these continuous efforts in various fields, the "strong barracks with established discipline" part was the most successful in the five promotion of barracks culture innovation. On the other hand, the relatively poor performance was the creation of a barracks where autonomy and responsibility were harmonized. Among them, the detailed questions with the highest average score were "Are the resting conditions well guaranteed after work?" and "Is the soldier's sense of autonomy and responsibility improved?".

The average score of the detailed questions selected for each part and the average score of the rough feeling survey questions asked in the overall section of the questionnaire were compared. If the results are normal, the results through detailed questions should be similar to the results of the schematic sensory survey. Unlike other parts where the difference was

less than 0.1%, the difference was relatively large in the "strong barracks with established discipline" part. The causes of this can be found in various parts, but rather than judging that this difference was caused by a particular event or complex logic error, it was difficult to make precise judgments in simply responding to a comprehensive question, resulting in differences from detailed questions. For the reference, the overall average of the five parts and the detailed questions are shown in the table below.

Table 2. Average score per part as a result of the military culture innovation survey.

	Overall mean	Detail question average
Healthy and safe barracks	2.1019	2.2208
Open barracks communicating with society	2.0125	2.0003
Human rights-guaranteed barracks	2.0529	2.1404
Well-balanced barracks of autonomy and responsibility	2.1330	2.1278
Strong barracks with established discipline	1.9536	2.1132

The difference between the officer group and the soldier group of each part of the military culture innovation is as shown in <Table 3> below. Firstly, the average of the officer group for the Healthy and Stable barracks part was 1.7653, the average of the soldier group was 2.2397, and secondly, the average of the officer group for the open barracks building part was 1.6905, and the average of the soldier group was 1.9932. Thirdly, the average of officer groups for the 'human rights-guaranteed barracks' part was 1.6712 and the average of the mercenary group was 2.2237. Fourthly, the average of officer groups for the 'autonomous and responsible barracks' part was 1.8548, and the average of the 'strong barracks' part was 1.507. As such, the mean difference between the two groups ranged from as little as 0.3 to as much as 0.55, which could be determined to be significant in that the sample size was large and the difference between the values of the mean. The part where the difference between the officer group and the soldier group appears to be the smallest is the "military camp that communicates with society," while the part showing the biggest difference was the "military camp that guarantees human rights."

Table 3. Average of the sensitivity of the officer group and the soldier group for each part of the innovation of the barracks culture.

Sortation	Officer group	Soldier group
Healthy and safe barracks	1.7653	2.2397
Open barracks communicating with society	1.6905	1.9932
Human rights-guaranteed barracks	1.6712	2.2237
Well-balanced barracks of autonomy and responsibility	1.8548	2.2157
Strong barracks with established discipline	1.5072	1.9761

As such, the average comparison between groups for each part determined that the officer group and the soldier group differed in terms of their feeling of military culture innovation, and SPSS independent sample T test was examined to see if this difference was significant. The independent sample T test was conducted on each of the five parts of the barracks culture innovation with 95% reliability, and in conclusion, all five parts were statistically significant. The analysis results for each part of the SPSS program are described in the following tables.

Table 4. Comprehensive analysis of independent samples T for each part.

Sortation	Significant probability of levene equivalence test	Significant probability of t-test for mean equality		Significance determination
		If equivariance is assumed(adopt null hypothesis)	If equal variances are not assumed (adopt research hypothesis)	
Healthy and safe barracks	0.092	0		Significant
Open barracks communicating with society	0.065	0		Significant
Human rights-guaranteed barracks	0.114	0		Significant
Well-balanced barracks of autonomy and responsibility	0.019		0	Significant
Strong barracks with established discipline	0		0	Significant

Note: Perform analysis with 95% confidence.

<Table 4> summarizes the significant probabilities of each part used in determining significance as a result of the independent sample T test analysis. From this table, the significance of Levene's equivalent variance test shows that the first three parts adopt null hypotheses, and the subsequent two parts adopt a research hypothesis, which, in conclusion, all five parts are significant, depending on the significance of each. As such, the second analysis of the difference between a soldier and an officer showed that there was a clear difference in between a soldier group and an officer group, and this difference was significant.

5. Conclusion

The ultimate result of this study is that the achievements of the military culture innovation, which has been pursued by the government since 2014, are positive. When analyzing the average score of selected questions through the analysis of factors in the SPSS program, all five parts of the promotion of military culture innovation were positive. However, when this performance analysis was divided into officer and soldier groups, the difference between the two groups was clearly evident, and the independent sample T test of the SPSS program showed that the difference was significant. This showed that overall satisfactory results were found in the innovation of the barracks culture, but there was a significant difference in the feeling of officers and soldiers, and that there were more positive results for the officer group[13][14].

A large number of survey respondents supplemented the intrinsic limitations of the sample survey and ultimately contributed to demonstrating the validity of the results derived from this study by increasing the confidence in the findings. In addition, since it was conducted by various classes and personnel from various units, the analysis results were not distorted and were highly reliable in analyzing the achievements of the barracks culture innovation. Through this, an interim evaluation was conducted on the innovation of the barracks culture, which has been being pursued since 2014, and realistic improvements were presented. In particular, it was also significant that the survey was the first to use it as recent data to analyze the achievements of military culture innovation professionally. Therefore, it was determined that further research will be possible in various ways in the future,

starting with this study. In addition, qualitative performance analysis was conducted by analyzing the sensitivity of soldiers experiencing military culture innovation and analyzing their thoughts, not focusing on and quantitative performance analysis as a result of previously conducted. Through this, it was not just about seeing the short-term results, but about the soldiers' feelings, satisfaction, and thoughts[15][16].

Aforementioned, as the scale between the questions of the questionnaire 'The Survey on the Feeling of Military Culture Innovation' causes difference in meaning, the study was conducted through the conversion of the scale. Nevertheless, for the differences in the scale and the uncalculable errors that would have initially occurred during the conversion process, the limitations are that they would have had a somewhat negative impact on the accuracy and reliability of the findings. Furthermore, the aggregated amount of survey responses was so limited in reality to dataize and analyze them at a personal level that the subjective questions were not actively utilized in this work. However, the analysis of subjective questions is expected to greatly help produce various opinions on the innovation of the barracks culture and valuable analysis results. In the follow-up study, more specific improvements will be presented through the analysis of subjective questions and constructive guidelines for the future.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	KK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	WK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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The Dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Emergence of the CIS System, and Ethnic Disputes

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Abstract

Purpose: It was self-evident that nationalism emerged as the Soviet Union, which had the largest number of ethnic groups on the planet, disbanded. The result of the dominant ethnic group's failure to maintain equal relations without discrimination between ethnic groups as it integrates minorities nationally is inevitably an expression of conflict in the democratization process. The purpose of this paper is to study what ethnic conflicts have occurred in the region since the formation of the CIS.

Method: In the past, Ukraine and Georgia, newly independent countries in the Soviet region, faced the problem of separation of minorities domestically. The separation of Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine, the Abkhazia conflict and the South Ossetia conflict in Georgia are examples. Therefore, I analyze these examples in this paper.

Results: In Donetsk and Luhansk states of Ukraine, Russia directly intervened in the claims of separation and subsequent civil war, including military mobilization and support, and in Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia demanded separation from Georgia. Through the conflict, Russia strengthened its influence in these regions.

Conclusion: The separation between the Ukrainian and Georgian conflicts from other conflicts in the Eastern Europe of the post-Cold War was that there was direct military intervention by Russia, which escalated the conflict between the United States and Russia. In the future, Russia is expected to actively respond to the threat of Russia's security due to nationalist political movements of ethnic minorities within the CIS.

[Keywords] Soviet Union, CIS, Cold War, Ethnic Disputes, National Security

1. Introduction

Gorbachev said in his farewell speech at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union that the world would be embroiled in a local war due to ethnic problems, as the dissolution of the Soviet Union revealed potential problems under Soviet influence. Contrary to expectations that a lasting peace would come at the end of the Cold War, conflicts caused by ethnic problems escalated in the Eastern Europe, as Gorbachev predicted, leading to bloodshed.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was a huge change of perception in the Eurasian continent. The new Russian Federation, which succeeded the Soviet Union, faced border changes in all but the Russian Far East. With the independence of the republics, de-Russian policy was accelerated, and the pro-Western defense of the former allies made Russia's already unstable security environment even worse.

New democratization in these regions is called the "Color Revolution." The color revolution first began in Georgia. The color revolution in Georgia, called the "Rose Revolution," stems from a crowd protesting with roses against then-Russian President Sevardnadze's fraudulent election in 2003. The Rose Revolution eventually led to the fall of Sevardnadze and the elec-

tion of the pro-American Saakashvili. After the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the 2005 Lemon Revolution, Russia lost its influence in the former Soviet region. In other words, countries that served as former allies and security buffer zones joined NATO and the EU or showed hostile relations with Russia.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought about the expression of the oppressed minorities, and ethnic conflicts between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe exploded. In the course of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS), some Republics achieved full independence and some did not officially join the CIS, but only maintained cooperative relationships. Ukraine and Georgia clashed with Russia over the independence of minorities in their own country, but they were exposed to inferior military power. The conflict in the region remains unsolved.

2. Dissolution of the Soviet Union and CIS

2.1. The prelude to the dissolution of the Soviet Union

By the end of 1989, the Communist regime of five Warsaw Pact members had collapsed, and the Berlin Wall had collapsed. The incident meant that the people of Central Europe and the Soviet Union did not support Gorbachev's push for communist modernization. Starting with Poland, five members of the Warsaw Pact broke down the Communist regime, and in 1989 the Soviet Union elected a new member of the Soviet People's Congress. For the first time since 1917, the Soviet people were able to enjoy some limited democratization through democratic voting.

Most of the members of the People's Congress were Communist Party members, but later constitutional amendments and direct elections for 15 Republican presidents took place. In 1990, 15 Soviet republics had their first multi-party elections, with many republics winning majority seats, and the Communist Party lost power in six republics: Lithuania, Moldova, Estonia, Latvia, Armenia and Georgia. In addition, each republic of the Soviet Union began to declare national sovereignty. These republics began to refuse to comply with federal law and took steps to either deny the federal government control of the economy or exempt the Soviet military from conscription.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was attributed to a combination of poor military power, Gorbachev's failure to Perestroika, authoritarian political systems and inefficient economic systems, and the loss of control over 15 republics and the departure of communist Eastern Europe[1].

The failure of Perestroika, federal referendum, presidential election, and August coup were indirect factors for the Soviet Union. The ruling group was divided into conservative and reform groups, while the conservative group was divided into hard-line conservatives and moderate conservatives, while the reform group was divided into centrist and radical reform groups[2].

Gorbachev's economic reform policy was a new experiment, so it failed to produce results and confusion continued, and political democratization faced resistance from Communist Party members and bureaucrats. Under these circumstances, Boris Yeltsin was elected as the new president of the Russian Republic[3].

Meanwhile, a referendum was held on whether to maintain a federal system in 15 republics, with nine republics having more than 75% of the votes in favor. The remaining six republics rejected the referendum, and the Ukrainian republics opposed the federal system. Gorbachev's last gamble to save the Union from dissolution, the result of the so-called "All-Federal Referendum for Federal Conservation" on 17 March 1991, illustrates this irony, with special exceptions such as the Baltic and Georgia, the majority of non-Slavish members expressed clear opposition to the dissolution.

As a whole, it is no exaggeration to say that there was overwhelming approval for the continuation of the federation throughout the region where the vote was held. In the case of the three Baltic states, Georgia, and Armenia, where anti-Soviet separatists took full control of the political initiative, the Republican government refused to hold a referendum, and only in a small part voted and counted.

Gorbachev's Perestroika failed, which led to coups led by Prime Minister Pavlov, Vice President Yanayv and KGB Chairman Kryuchkov. In August 1991, the coup demanded Gorbachev declare a state of emergency and transfer to the vice-president of power. The coup failed in three days due to resistance from citizens. During the arrest of the coup forces and the collapse of the Communist Party, Yeltsin had the image of a nationwide leader. It was crucial to deliver a speech against the coup against citizens during the coup.

Federal President Gorbachev and President Yeltsin of the Russian Republic were at odds, and there was a disagreement over national policy between the two, but there was no way to coordinate their opinions. Gorbachev is a rational socialist, while Yeltsin is a market economy advocate. Gorbachev also envisioned a federal system based on a strong central government, while Yeltsin advocated an equal union of states between republics.

2.2. Loose union: establishment of the commonwealth of independent states

In December 1991, the creation of an independent community of three republics, Russia, Ukraine, and White Russia, accelerated the dissolution of the federation based on the national solidarity of the pan-Slavs. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was an unexpected phenomenon. Although the Soviet Union reacted forcefully to the resistance of its people under a totalitarian system, it did not take any coercive action during the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The dissolution of the federation resulted in a vacuum of state power, and the congress of each republic decided on important government policies. The congress consisted of 12 members without the Baltic states and Georgia. Gorbachev served until 25 December 1991, when the federation was officially dissolved, but his authority was extremely limited and only symbolic.

The Soviet Union was dissolved by the 1991 Declaration of 142–H, which recognized the independence of all republics and the Union of Independent States. President Gorbachev dissolved the leadership and succeeded Boris Yechin to power. Prior to the declaration, all Soviet republics had withdrawn from the Union or from the Soviet Treaty, and 11 republics had agreed to dismantle the Soviet Union and signed the Almaata Treaty, which declared the establishment of the commonwealth of independent state(CIS). Ukraine declared its independence in August 1991, followed by ten republics. In December of the same year, the Federal Treaty of 1922 was scrapped.

Following the declaration of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many Republics agreed to the CIS, and five other countries, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, established the Commonwealth of Independent States Eurarian Economic Community(EAEC or EurAsEC). In 1999, Russia and Belarus signed a treaty to create a Russian-Belarus National Union between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. Russia signed the Belarusian Allies Agreement, and the two countries maintain their sovereignty and status. The Baltic counties(Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), which are closest to Western Europe, have close ties with the West, joining NATO and the European Union.

The CIS system is maintained because of the economic interdependence of the former Soviet Union, the economic dependence of the CIS countries except Russia, and economic similarity, and politically, most countries maintain authoritarian regimes and the people prefer strong states. On the other hand, Russia claims vested interests in the CIS, opposes the presence or cooperation of a third country in the region, and actively intervenes in the event of conflict[4].

3. Eastern Europe Conflicts in Post-Cold War Period

3.1. The post-cold war and the nationalist political movement

The number of disputes increased in the late 1990s, especially the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to the birth of a newly independent state, which led to disputes between Russia and the newly independent state, or the newly independent state. Typical disputes include the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Russia-Georgia conflict, and the Russia-Chechnya conflict.

It can be seen that the method of classifying conflict causes consists of surface factors. An intrinsic and practical factor can be derived from nationalism. Not to mention the people who are the cause of the conflict, most of the territories/border, resources, separation autonomy, independence, anti-foreign taxes, and religion are inherently related to nationalist interests. This pattern of conflict is caused by conflicts between nations and ethnic conflicts within multi-ethnic countries, and the ostensible cause of conflict is a combination of various political and economic factors[5].

It suggests that nationalism is in place as a higher factor in most cases, consisting of two or more complex sub-factors. Contrary to the so-called futurists' claim that the meaning of borders will fade due to internationalization and globalization, and that ethnic conflicts will decrease, nationalism is still valid, and nationalist competition and conflict continue. Types of disputes include territorial disputes, disputes over natural resources, ethnic disputes, religious disputes, and ideological disputes[6].

The end of ideological conflict by the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War gave the international community a sense of triumph over free democracy and an optimistic hope for the international order. However, as the international community changed to a pluralistic system, local and domestic disputes arose due to various issues. Conflicts have become a threat to regional stability and international order due to the outbreak of refugees, violence and conflict[7].

The development of telecommunications media, weakening of national control, and development of military technology have put the international community in a state of instability. The sudden ethnic conflict with the atmosphere of the post-Cold War divided expectations for a new world into pessimism and optimism. Francis Fukuyama and Robert Kapla are leading theorists. In other words, the former declared liberalism and the universal victory of the market economy on the part of the reformist side, while the latter warned of the advent of an anarchic era from the public perspective of the Third World[8].

Are recent ethnic conflicts the product of the Cold War and the collapse of the polar system? Some scholars are positive about this and others do not acknowledge the existence of this trend[9][10][11].

Contrary to optimistic expectations that the end of the Cold War will soon open an era of peace in the international community, even today, there is no sign of local conflict or violent struggle due to various reasons such as national ideology, religious conflict, poverty and misery, and scarce resources. The world has yet to fully escape from ideological confrontation and the Cold War, and has a security dilemma in which arms buildup becomes a universal phenomenon rather than arms reduction. In other words, the specific causes of many conflicts remain in the world. In particular, the pursuit of more prestige, the struggle for economic superiority, hostile nationalism, differences in legitimacy, religious hostility, and the desire to expand territory[12].

3.2. Ethnic divisions in Russia

The most important motivation for the divisive trend that emerged in Russia is multi-ethnic composition[13]. The Russian-led ethnic group in the CIS region consists of the Russian ethnic group (about 80%) and 184 ethnic minorities. The problem with the Russian Federation based on ethnicity is that the dominant Russian does not have his own republic, resulting in a disproportionate relationship between the autonomous and Russian peoples with republics.

Shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was argued that the Russian people should have their own republic[14][15].

After the formation of CIS, ethnic conflicts continued in the former Soviet Union[16]. Examples include armed conflict with the Maldives due to Russian demands for independence in the Dniester region of the Republic of Moldova, clashes between Georgia and North Ossetia, armed conflict with separatists in the Georgian government and Abkhazia, terrorism against Russians in Tajikistan, and legislation. The Russians, who moved to various republics during the former Soviet Union, began to be discriminated against as they became minorities. In response, Russians in the region are collectively claiming rights to discrimination or engaging in armed struggles[17].

Minorities in Russia did not express separatist tendencies during the former Soviet era, not because their national awareness was extinguished, but because political movements were suppressed. After 1989, political liberalization began to revitalize the repressed nationalist movement. Minorities hoped to establish an independent state that could respond to Russia. However, all minorities and republics had difficulty leaving the existing economic system because their own economic bases were weak. He is in a dilemma where he wants an independent country but has no choice but to remain in the CIS. Nevertheless, the Baltic countries and Georgia did not participate in the CIS, while Ukraine and Turkmenistan remained unofficial participants in the CIS.

4. Russia's Strategic Intervention in Ethnic Conflict

4.1. Separation from Ukraine: Donetsk and Luhansk

After the Cold War, NATO expanded eastward, with the first expansion in 1999 to include the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, and the second expansion in 2004 to include three Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia[18]. NATO's expansion plan had already calculated the possibility of Georgia and Ukraine joining, and in June 2008, the EU Parliament planned to have the European Commission prepare for an Eastern Partnership, converting Baltic countries and the former Soviet republics into EU economies. This change has increased the sense of crisis that Russia's former Warsaw Pact allies have now joined the hostile military alliance, NATO, to surround themselves.

After independence, security issues emerged as the most important national agenda in Ukraine. This was essentially a reflection of strong anxiety and obsession with the security of the Ukrainian ruling elite. The reason for this is largely explainable in two ways. First of all, on the external side, Ukraine, a newly sovereign country, was exposed to constant security threats from Russia. Russia was a country with various policy means to exert direct pressure and influence on Ukraine. For example, the separation of the Crimea Republic, the presence of Russian Black Sea fleets, borderline determination, and high Russian dependence on the economic sector and energy resources have added to Ukraine's security concerns. For this reason, the Ukrainian government became more active in seeking a complete departure from Russia's influence, namely its own sovereignty and security measures.

Also internally, the Ukrainian leadership was facing social challenges that could undermine territorial unity and national security. Among them, differences between ethnic and regional identities derived from the unique historical development process existed as factors of conflict within Ukrainian society[19].

In particular, eastern and western regionalism was highly likely to serve as a significant obstacle to Ukraine's national system and social integration process. Thus, the Ukrainian leadership was seriously concerned about the eruption of political and social conflicts between the pro-Russian eastern regions and the pro-European western regions. If regionalism or separatist movements are unleashed within society, causing serious damage to national unity, it could be a fatal threat to Ukraine's security establishment[20].

In 2008, the Georgian crisis was an extremely sensitive reaction to the expansion of NATO and the EU's Eastern Partnership. In Ukraine, the Sevastopol base in Crimea is the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which would be impossible to enter the Mediterranean if the fleet lost its function, as well as expose the security of the Russian mainland to threats and weaken its influence on Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In February 2014, Ukraine's pro-Russian Yanukovich regime collapsed in the face of resistance from citizens, and a referendum was held in Crimea in March asking whether Russia belonged to Russia, which led to Russia's annexation. Since April, the separation of Russian residents in Donetsk and Luhansk states in southeastern Ukraine has resulted in nearly 10,000 deaths, 20,000 injuries and 1.2 million refugees. On April 7, 2014, pro-Russian protesters who occupied the state building declared the establishment of the Donetsk People's Republic, and on May 11, a referendum was held on independence.

On 24 May of the same year, the Donetsk People's Republic became part of the Novorossiia Federal State. At the same time, pro-Russian protests broke out in Luhansk. Pro-Russian protesters attempted to occupy public buildings and fought with Ukrainian government forces. On April 29, protesters took control of major buildings such as the local government building and the prosecution office building. The Luhansk People's Republic gained independence on 11 May, with 96% support in the 2014 Luhansk state referendum. Subsequently, separatists attempted to expand their territory across borders, but failed. In a series of processes, Russia exercised political influence in Crimea and southeastern Ukraine, and directly intervened in military mobilization and support[21].

4.2. The Abkhazia conflict and the South Ossetia conflict in Georgia

Georgia became an independent Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936, a part of the Soviet Union. The Georgian territories now include Abkhazia and South Ossetia, who are pro-Russian and seek independence from Georgia, which have only been granted independence from Russia and are not recognized as independent states by most countries[22].

The collapse of the Soviet Union can be seen as the most direct factor in the power relations and geopolitical reorganization of the Eurasian continent. In August 2008, the Russia-Georgia conflict was an opportunity to change the landscape of power that had so far been unfavorable to Russia in Eurasia[23].

The Russia-Georgia conflict quickly cooled US-Russia relations, and there was even a view that this situation was a threat to the New Cold War. However, Putin said that there was no Cold War between Russia and the West, and that there was a geopolitical difference[24]. Georgia has not faced any dilemma in choosing a national strategy of integration into the West since independence in 1991[25].

European integration was an agenda of Georgia's foreign policy, and the motivation was clear, both politically and psychologically. The reason for this is first, that self-identification as a European is the national basis of Georgia. Second, the Georgian elite recognized the historical period from 1801 to 1991 when Russia ruled Georgia as a forced occupation by the Russian Empire. Third, Georgia views Russia as an occupation force, and in this regard is the Georgian Central Government-Abkhazia conflict and the Georgian Central Government-South Ossetia conflict[26].

Abkhazia is an unrecognized country in the western part of Zakapkaz, southeast of the Black Sea, bordering Russia. Abkhazia was under Turkish control and incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1810, and was incorporated into the Georgian Socialist Republic in 1918. Georgia's discrimination policy against Abkhazia has led to the rise of half-Georgia among Abkhazia residents. During the former Soviet Union, he also asked the federal government to withdraw from the Georgian Republic, join Russia, or establish an independent republic. During the Perestroika period, protests erupted to claim Abkhazia's independence, and armed clashes between Georgia and Abkhazia began. The civil war lasted for 14 months, with more than 4,000 deaths each. In the 10 years following the clash, 330,000 Georgian citizens left Abkhazia[27].

By 1991, a larger area had become Soviet territory, and as the Soviet Union began to disband in the late 1980s, ethnic conflicts between the Abkhazians and Georgians over Georgia's independence intensified. This led to the 1992 Abkhazia War, which ended with the defeat of the Georgian army, led to the virtual independence of Abkhazia, the mass movement of Georgians living in Abkhazia and ethnic cleansing of them. However, Georgia continued to rule the Upper Abkhaz region. Despite years of negotiations with the 1994 Moscow Agreement, the independence dispute between Abkhazia was not resolved.

Despite the prolonged presence of UN peacekeepers and CIS peacekeeping operations, conflicts have occurred several times. Following Russia's official recognition of Abkhazia, the cancellation of the Moscow Agreement, and the withdrawal of the United Nations and OSCE, the two sides eventually fought in the 2008 South Ossetia War. Georgia's defeat put the entire Abkhazia army under the rule of an unauthorized state. On 26 August of that year, the Georgian parliament passed a resolution declaring Abkhazia a Russian occupation. The majority of the international community believes that Abkhazia was taken over by the Russian army. Russia does not allow European Union monitors to enter the country.

South Ossetia borders the Russian-North Ossetian Republic. The population of South Ossetia is about 60% for Ossetians, 25% for Georgians, and 2% for Russians. Ossetia was annexed by the Russian Empire in 1774. After the 1917 revolution, Ossetia was separated into North and South Ossetia. South Ossetia was included in Georgia, where it gained independence as a result of the revolution. However, in February 1921, the Georgian government returned to Bolsheviks, forming Soviet power on 20 April 1922 and forming the South Ossetia Autonomous Region in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Georgia and South Ossetia strengthened the national movement with the beginning of Perestroika[28].

On 10 November 1989, the Supreme Council of South Ossetia decided to unify the Soviet Republic of North Ossetia, part of Russia. A day later, Georgia's parliament scrapped the decision, nullifying South Ossetia's autonomy. The Georgian Supreme Council amended the law in August 1990 to restrict the participation of parties in elections in certain regions. In response, the South Ossetians renamed the Autonomous Region of Ossetia 'South Ossetia Soviet Democratic Republic' and asked Moscow to recognize that it was an independent member of the former Soviet Union. When Moscow and Tbilisi refused, South Ossetia declared sovereignty.

On 23 November 1989, a Georgian nationalist movement rally was held in Tshinbali, where Ossetia and Georgian militants clashed for two days. In addition, soldiers from the Soviet Interior Ministry intervened. The Republic of South Ossetia was declared on 20 September 1990 and the Republic's Supreme Council elections were held on 9 December 1990. On 11 December, Georgia's parliament declared that elections were illegal and that it would abolish the South Ossetia Autonomous South Ossetia. On 6 January 1991, Georgian troops were deployed to South Ossetia, strengthened military activities, and the autonomous state was sealed off. Cruel armed clashes continued in the autonomous region between 1991 and 1992. Georgia's police forces were strategically controlled around Tshinbali, with numerous victims and deaths. According to Ossetia, more than 3,000 civilians were killed and more than 40,000 refugees were displaced by armed clashes between 1989 and 1992, with nearly 300 missing and more than 100 Ossetian villages burned. Georgia was unable to fully control the autonomous state at this time due to fierce resistance from the Ossetians.

Military activities were suspended after the signing of the Dagomysski agreement between Russian President Yeltsin and the head of the Georgian National Committee, Shevardnadze. On 14 July 1992, three battalions of peacekeepers (consisting of Russia, Georgia and Ossetia) were stationed in the disputed area, and South Ossetia became virtually independent. On January 19, 1992, a referendum was held for independence, with more than 98% of the residents in the area agreeing. On 29 May 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic adopted documents on independent states. South Ossetia created its own constitution, national symbols and parliament[29].

However, Georgian authorities treated Tskhinbali as a local administrative unit. South Ossetia rejected all ties with Georgia, raising tensions in the region. Moreover, South Ossetians officially sought compensation from Georgia for the 1989-1991 massacre. In June 2004, South Ossetia adopted a proposal to allow membership to the Russian Federation. In recent years, about 90% of South Ossetians have received Russian citizenship.

The Georgian conflict, which began in August 2008, was a war between Georgia and pro-Russian separatists in South Ossetia. On 7 August 2008, the Georgian army marched into Tskhinbali, the capital of the segregated South Ossetia, and the war began in earnest. In response to these attacks, the war began in earnest on 8 August when Russia crossed the border and marched ground forces, including tanks and field guns, in southern Ossetia. After five days, Georgia surrendered to Russia, but the Russian army marched through more parts of Georgia. On 13 August of the same year, Russia signed a peace proposal presented by France and withdrew its troops.

Distinguishing the 2008 Georgian conflict from other conflicts in the post-Cold War East Europe was the direct military intervention by Russia, which led to escalating conflict between the United States and Russia.

5. Conclusion

After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet Union established its borders without considering religious, ethnic, or historical facts, providing a direct cause for regional conflicts after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The former Soviet Union's excessive political implementation is based on communist theory. Lenin argued that "nationalism is the same as fascism" and sought to prevent internal divisions based on nationalism. However, communism did not extinguish the nation nor put nationalism to rest forever. In the Soviet Union, communism served as a governing ideology, not an ideology that united the entire nation and gained the support of the people.

Regional conflicts in the former Soviet bloc were ethnic conflicts caused by border adjustments that emerged as the legacy of the Russian Revolution. This feature is particularly evident in the Kavkaz region, which borders the Black Sea and the Azov Sea to the west and the Caspian Sea to the east. Prior to the Russian Revolution, no border existed between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia in the Kavkaz region. Only the Governor-General of Russia was in charge of the region, but excessive national integration and border planning later served as the cause of conflicts between the peoples.

The conflict in the region was indirectly caused by the weakening of control of the Soviet central government during the post-Cold War period. Of course, there was no conflict between nations before, but it did not develop into a conflict under the Soviet power. Gorbachev's perestroika, in other words, gave freedom to the Soviet people, but also brought about conflicts between nations.

Russia is directly or indirectly intervening in the dispute, fearing that it would lose its influence. This can be said to be a way to overcome Russia's poor security environment after the Cold War, and the former Soviet region is an area that can determine Russia's absolute national interest.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	SC	<ul style="list-style-type: none">-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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A Study on the Improvement System of National COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE Activities

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Abstract

Purpose: Counter-intelligence means any act in response to hostile foreign intelligence activities. Since the activities of intelligence agencies inherently recognize security as the greatest virtue, it was not easy to approach it in the academic field. However, the global information environment is changing rapidly. In the traditional concept of espionage, espionage was carried out mainly in the political and military areas, but in comprehensive security situations, information collection on various forms can take place, requiring a flexible strategy.

Method: However, despite the fact that anti-spy operations can directly be involved in infringement of the basic rights of the people, the fact that minimal ground rules exist is a problem that requires improvement in terms of the rule of law of information activities. Furthermore, the problem of this study is that even assuming the objective consideration that anti-spy work is necessary to guarantee basic rights of the people, and that it is not appropriate to impose public and judicial control such as investigation procedures, it is unfortunately not. In response, this study proposed improvements to prevent concerns about infringement of the basic rights of the people by guaranteeing practical anti-spy work in a changing environment.

Result: The first is the expansion of the concept and scope of the anti-spy. In other words, if the Framework Act on Anti-Spy is enacted, the concept of anti-spy should be set as an active and active anti-spy concept, not a passive or passive anti-spy concept, to diversify anti-spy operations and respond to both traditional and non-traditional threats. In addition, the government proposed the expansion of spy agencies to cope with the diversification of security threats due to changes in the information environment.

Second, he pointed out existing problems and made some forward-looking suggestions regarding the smooth performance of anti-spy operations. The most important confirmation here is the stipulation of the means of collection and verification of anti-spy information. The method of collecting anti-spy intelligence can be distinguished in legal and realistic ways, and the factual methods such as collecting human information, technical information, and public source information are problematic.

Conclusion: In particular, legal grounds and reliability, such as uncovering the identity or operating an informant, are problematic in the intelligence officer's performance of specific espionage tasks. In order to dispel this, it was confirmed that there is a need for evidence that the staff of the spy agency can impersonate their identity in specific tasks, and a legal basis that the spy agency can operate a cooperative.

[Keywords] Counter-Intelligence, National Security Law, Counter-Intelligence Intelligence, The Rule of Law of Intelligence Object, Comprehensive National Security

1. Intro

Counterintelligence activities are understood as all acts in response to hostile foreign intelligence activities and are recognized as a subclass of intelligence agency information activities in a systematic way. However, the activities of intelligence agencies inherently recognize

security as the greatest virtue, so accessing anti-spy from an academic perspective has been a challenging area. Furthermore, the normative discussion of the activities of intelligence agencies itself may lead to unnecessary misunderstandings (politicization of so-called information) making it more difficult[1].

However, the global information environment is changing rapidly. The traditional security environment has been discussed under political and military confrontations centered on the polar system of the US and the Soviet Union, but with the rise of the 21st century, the concept of a traditional security environment has come to an end. The end of the Cold War, informatization, and globalization have sent traditional security concepts to a page of history, and the vacancy is occupied by a new security environment. In other words, the concept of state-central security, which traditionally emphasizes only the sovereignty of the state, has changed from a concept of comprehensive security that extends the subject of security to individuals, organizations, businesses, natural environments, and international organizations. In the traditional concept of espionage, espionage was carried out mainly in the political and military areas, but in comprehensive security situations, information collection on various forms can take place, which requires a flexible strategy.

But what is the legislative reality of our country about anti-spy activities? Currently, the National Intelligence Service Act is the only legal basis for espionage, and there are only "regulations for planning and coordination of information and security departments" and "regulations for espionage" under the presidential decree. Despite the fact that espionage can directly violate the basic rights of the people like other information and investigation agencies, there are many problems in terms of improving the efficiency of espionage activities and "the rule of law" under the global information environment. Furthermore, even assuming the objective consideration that anti-spy work is necessary to guarantee the basic rights of the people, and that public and judicial control is not appropriate, such as investigation procedures, questions are raised about whether the current regulations for anti-spy work can achieve a certain purpose.

As a result, this study aims to present improvements to prevent concerns over infringement of the basic rights of the people by enhancing the efficiency of the anti-spy work in a changing environment and guaranteeing practical anti-spy work. First of all, we will critically examine the current attitude of the law to regulate espionage, specifically focusing on the National Intelligence Service Act and sub-commands(2). This will lead to specific limitations of the anti-spy operations carried out in these legislations(3). Finally, we would like to present improvements to overcome the limitations of performing these anti-spy tasks(4).

2. Status of Anti-Spy Operations Under the Current Legislation

2.1. National intelligence service Korea act

Under the National Intelligence Service Korea Act, three major articles related to espionage are Article 1(purpose), Article 3(duties), and Article 15(request for cooperation with state agencies).

The problem is that under the current National Intelligence Service Korea Act, the target of Counter-Intelligence is limited to national security[2]. Of course, the National Intelligence Service Act, a direct basis for espionage, limits the scope of espionage to national security guarantees, which seems to lack awareness of the changing global security environment. In addition, Article 3(1) of the National Intelligence Service Korea Act limits domestic information services to some "domestic security information," but there is also a problem that the National Intelligence Service is too narrow in scope of its domestic espionage operations[3].

2.2. Regulations for planning and coordination of intelligence and security affairs

Regulations for Planning and Coordination of Intelligence and Security Affairs for the purpose of prescribing matters necessary for the planning and coordination of Intelligence and security affairs shall not directly prescribe Counter-Intelligence affairs. However, Article 2(Define) 2 stipulates that "the domestic security information is treated to ensure the safety of the country from harmful acts against spies and other anti-state activities" and Article 4 stipulates that "the measures to prevent or delay the leakage of secrets directly or indirectly by means of communication." In addition, the National Intelligence Service(NIS) designates the scope of planning and coordination work with related agencies(Articles 4 and 5) and stipulates procedures for planning and coordination work(Articles 6) and audit procedures for information business, budget and security work(Article 11).

The purpose of this regulation is to prescribe matters necessary for the planning and coordination of intelligence and security affairs. Therefore, the government should plan integrated planning and coordination of intelligence and security affairs with the Executive Branch, establishing basic guidelines for national security policies, legislative and judicial branches[4].

2.3. Counter-intelligence regulations

The National Intelligence Service has been performing counterintelligence in response to all-round domestic information activities of foreign intelligence agencies. Recently, the government-wide integrated counterintelligence system has been established to systematically and efficiently respond to foreign intelligence activities. According to the necessity of operation 2012.05.14. In accordance with Article 3(Occupation), Paragraph 2 of the National Intelligence Service Act, the "Counter-Intelligence regulations(Presidential Decree No. 3780)" are enacted and implemented.

The enactment of these regulations is a tangible achievement in the history of the country's Counter-Intelligence operations and is evaluated as the result of efforts by the National Intelligence Service and related agencies to efficiently carry out Counter-Intelligence operations at the government level[5].

However, the above regulations lack judicial control over espionage, which is likely to violate basic rights, as there are no sub-laws that have weak legal grounds and specific procedures for execution of duties.

2.4 Conclusion

As shown above, the National Intelligence Service Act is the only law that is based on the law to carry out espionage operations, and there are "Regulations for Planning and Coordination of Intelligence and Security Affairs" and "Counter-intelligence regulations" as lower legislation. The fundamental purpose of espionage is to seek national security as a means to guarantee the basic rights of the people. The problem is that the role of carrying out anti-spy operations can inevitably limit the basic rights of the people. Of course, this is the same investigative activities by investigative agencies, but there is a difference in the fact that while investigative activities have safety devices under various normative systems, including the Criminal Procedure Act, espionage has a profound legislative gap. In other words, the attitude of our law is not the case even though judicial control through the normative system considering the specificity of espionage can guarantee democratic legitimacy in the country's espionage operations. Furthermore, the performance of anti-spy operations under lower legislation can be criticized. In particular, the anti-spy business regulations can actually be seen as a minimum legislative device for anti-spy operations flood, as the anti-spy operations regulations do not have minimum conditions for performing anti-spy operations in a changing security environment.

In other words, the lack of democratic legitimacy, predictability, and court control despite the power of state agencies is the biggest problem and starting point of the norm system in charge of current Counter-Intelligence[6].

3. Problems of Counter-Intelligence Activities

3.1. Recent changes in counter-intelligence activities

The reorganization of the world order after the post-Cold War led to drastic changes in the intelligence environment, including changes in national security awareness and concepts. In the past, in the dichotomous structure of Cold War enemies and allies, intelligence priorities were limited to military security due to clear targets and goals. However, the post-Cold War intelligence environment expands the scope and scope of intelligence activities, ranging from traditional security threats such as military and defense to terrorism, environmental pollution, health and resource crisis[7]. And this requires intelligence organizations to expand effective intelligence activities[8].

Furthermore, the transnational phenomenon caused by the intensification of globalization shows a different aspect from existing national-centered intelligence activities in the subject, subject, scope, and response methods with the emergence of transnational threats[9]. In other words, the concept of state-central security, which emphasized only the sovereignty of the state and the state, was expanded to non-state entities such as individual, organization, business, natural environment, and international organizations, and the concept of comprehensive security[10].

On top of that, the rapid development of information and communication technology is seriously affecting the information environment at home and abroad, by promoting political pluralism and democratization in the international community as well as in the domestic society[11]. As the Jasmine Revolution in the Middle East in early 2011, the change in the information environment is having a tremendous ripple effect on the political environment.

On the other hand, the above changes may be seen as a demand for strengthening democratic control and monitoring of intelligence agencies by causing controversy over possession of basic rights due to the expansion of the scope of intelligence activities[12]. These sensitive issues result in citizens' calls for stricter regulations and control of domestic intelligence activities on intelligence agencies, and calls for political neutralization of intelligence agencies are much stronger. Of course, information institutions need to be reformed in line with political and social changes, but as such weak information activities are likely to be used in the psychological warfare of hostile forces, it is a matter to be watched closely in terms of smooth national defense or strengthening security[13].

3.2. Lack of legislation of basic laws and enforcement ordinances of counter-intelligence

As previously discussed, the grounding law for espionage is a counterintelligence regulation in the form of a presidential decree based on Article 3(2) of the National Intelligence Service Korea Act, and there is no sub-law that regulates the specific process of execution of duties.

There are the following arguments as to what specific authority an counter-intelligence agency has in performing counter-intelligence duties and, furthermore, whether there should be separate legal grounds for individual performance of duties: "There is no country that has laws and regulations on the method or authority of individual or specific execution of duties, as there is no fixed form in the collection of information or counter-intelligence." "Because it is very difficult to define specific methods or authority related to espionage by typifying specific methods of execution or authority in accordance with various specific circumstances, it is feared that the statute will limit the anti-spy work that should respond flexibly to specific situations," he said. Subsequently, "According to the theory of the Administrative Organization Act, the Administrative Office shall have general authority to execute its duties within the scope of the duties prescribed by the organization and the code of duties. Accordingly, the National Intelligence Service has general authority to execute its duties based on the National Intelligence Service Korea Act and the counter-intelligence duty regu-

lations, and does not require a separate act of reference"[14]. The above view is worth listening to the interpretation of current regulations that do not have a complete system of anti-intelligence law, especially if the National Intelligence Service's job execution is aimed at the public, it can be exercised by organizational and job norms.

However, in the case of specific public power activities targeting individual citizens, such as anti-spy investigations, there shall be grounds for law in accordance with the principle of legal reservation and shall be carried out in compliance. The bigger problem is that as the concept of espionage expands due to rapid changes in the global information environment and the advent of the cyber era due to rapid changes in the information and communication environment, the democratic legitimacy of espionage can be easily undermined. Cases where such problems may occur are considered according to the type of espionage task as follows.

First of all, it is a typical case of espionage for foreign governments, organizations, or foreigners and Koreans related to them. According to the general legal theory, there is no need for a separate act of law to perform espionage in a non-powerful way, such as cooperation, but for investigation and power methods, a separate act of law is required. Next, it is the case of defensive espionage that detects, blocks, and checks information collection activities or secret operations against foreign countries. Defensive espionage is mainly carried out through follow-up monitoring, conversation monitoring, on-site recruitment, search activities, cyber activities, etc. Direct measures may be taken, such as arresting domestic or foreign agents employed by foreign intelligence agencies or expelling foreign intelligence agents disguised as diplomats. In the case of surveillance, however, there can be problems of infringement of rights, such as privacy secrets, and arrest or deportation is a direct exercise of public power over a particular person, which requires legal authority based on individual laws.

3.3. Lack of efficient means of counter-intelligence operations

Intelligence is probably the most important thing not only in criminal investigations but also in counter-intelligence. This is because clues are needed to serve as a basis for the performance of counter-intelligence, and due to the nature of espionage, intelligence-level information that is different from those of general investigations will be needed. Therefore, how and to what extent this intelligence will be collected will be the most important issue in the performance of Korea Act and counter-intelligence regulations are silent on the collection of such counter-intelligence intelligence. This can be interpreted that our legislation basically presupposes anti-spy in the concept of passive counter-intelligence, and that the uniform collection of counter-intelligence intelligence sets the inherent limitations of counter-intelligence work.

The collection of intelligence can be made in various forms. To distinguish this from legal and realistic methods, legal intelligence collection means legal collection activities under the Criminal Procedure Act and the Police Officers' Duty Execution Act, and realistic methods mean collection of HUMINT, TECHINT, and OSINT. It is the collection of counter-intelligence intelligence that can be the starting point for counter-intelligence operations, and this is actually an area where infringement of the basic rights of the people can occur except for the collection of public intelligence. Therefore, there is a limitation that the means and methods for performing counter-intelligence operations can be collected on the internal basis of counter-intelligence agencies without prescribing minimum guidelines in advance, which do not in accordance with the principle of national law.

4. Improvement of Counter-Intelligence Operations for Efficiency and Legality

4.1. Enactment of the framework act on the performance of counter-intelligence

service

Currently, the performance of anti-spy duties is supplemented by the recently revised anti-spy regulations, which are basically carried out under Articles 1 and 3 of the National Intelligence Service Act. However, this reality cannot guarantee the democratic legitimacy of the anti-spy work, and it is a well-known fact that it is undermining the predictability of the people's predictability. Therefore, it has long been argued that there is a need to enact a law on the basis of espionage[15]. In particular, the main school did not point out the limitations of the current counter-intelligence regulations, but there are limitations of counter-intelligence under criminal law, so legislative technology can establish the basis law for counter-intelligence and proactively improve the composition of counter-intelligence. Therefore, if the government intends to discuss the improvement of counter-intelligence activities, it must consider enacting the basis law, which is consistent with the principle of state and legal reservation.

However, the establishment of a ground law on the performance of counter-intelligence will strongly raise non-lawful issues, not legal issues. In the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2015, he also experienced a severe division of public opinion, as the performance of anti-terrorism operations is more likely to be criticized than counterterrorism. In addition, it is possible to argue whether separate legislative measures are needed, as counter-intelligence work has been carried out in the form of the current enforcement ordinance.

Non-law matters, especially controversy over political pros and cons, should also be considered in implementing legislative measures to carry out counter-intelligence operations. However, if the current counter-intelligence work is raised to the normative field, it is necessary not only to secure democratic justification for counter-intelligence work but to free the counter-intelligence agency from unnecessary political controversy. Therefore, there is an extraterritorial risk of political controversy, but the enactment of a basic law on the performance of counter-intelligence affairs is an area worthy of consideration.

4.2. The expansion of foreign concepts subject to counter-intelligence

Against foreign intelligence activities, in line with the interpretation of "North Korea" in the interpretation of the law, causes problems. As you may note, Article 3 of our Constitution stipulates that "the territory of the Republic of Korea shall be the Korean Peninsula and its affiliated islands," so the Republic of Korea Constitution applies to North Korea. The majority opinion and attitude of the Supreme Court are the same in constitutional academia[16]. In other words, South Korea's constitutional order, attitude of precedent and interpretation of the National Security Law make it impossible to respond to North Korea's intelligence activities under the current counter-intelligence rules because North Korea is not within the scope of the state. Of course, counterintelligence operations against North Korea may be carried out in practice, but in terms of the rule of law, practical reality should also be carried out under the normative power of the law.

In addition, if counter-intelligences are based on foreign concepts, they cannot respond to security threats by transnational criminal organizations that are not included in any country. Terrorism crimes are emerging as a serious threat to domestic safety worldwide, and in reality, where the importance of cyberspace by physical space is increasing, if a security risk incident occurs by a non-state actor or if it is raised for security, it cannot be responded by conventional counter-intelligence.

Furthermore, if you look back on the fact that you are a Korean, this raises a problem. In other words, the conventional concept of counter-intelligence is that foreign governments use Koreans to target counter-intelligence operations, but Koreans cannot voluntarily target counter-intelligence regulations if they engage in acts that can affect national security and national interests.

4.3. The need for diversification of counter-intelligence targets

The end of the Cold War era and the emergence of various non-state actors are in line with the emergence of new players who can inevitably threaten national security. In other words, security concepts can change depending on the times and circumstances[17]. In this regard, security targets were not limited to traditional military and politics, but shifted to pursuing security in other areas of everyday life, such as economy, technology, energy, environment, and cyber areas. That is, the manifestation of the concept of human security. However, criticism could be raised that such areas are too broad for security[18]. In addition, it is too broad to be targeted for counter-intelligence, which is feared to violate the basic rights of the people.

In other words, the UNDP's proposals could include those included in economic, food, environmental, individual and community security, which meet the inherent purpose of espionage. Specifically, all areas of Korea, such as economic, technical, energy, environment, cyber, etc. shall be considered as targets for counter-intelligence[19].

4.4. Necessity of active counter-intelligence activities

According to the current counter-intelligence business regulations, counter-intelligence is essentially a passive concept. This means "all response activities". Having a passive and defensive personality was self-evident in that it carried out activities to protect the nation from the threat of hostile forces.

However, at a time when living under such a diversified security threat, passive activities are not appropriate because they are already inevitable after infringement on national security and national interests[20]. In the era of comprehensive security threats, security threats can occur in various areas, including economic and industrial security, advanced IT technology, munitions acquisition, international crime, and cybercrime, which are not only extremely difficult to recover, but also inevitably requires an active and preemptive concept. Strategic anti-spy concept is that when using anti-spy as a means of national security, it can perform offensive functions, not defensive functions, and contribute to the establishment of national strategies through countermeasures against foreign intelligence agencies' plans, intentions, and abilities[21].

Therefore, we should also consider converting the concept of anti-spy from conventional passive counteract activities to preemptive counteract activities. However, if the concept of espionage is a preemptive response activity, specific types of actions can be problematic in terms of the rule of law of information. To this end, the specificity of the type of act can be sought by listing examples such as "deception, destruction, subversion, special operation, etc." and details can be sought by resolving sub-legislation.

4.5. Reviewing the possibility of expanding the counter-intelligence agency

4.5.1. The starting point of the problem

According to the counter-intelligence activity regulations, counter-intelligence agencies are designated as the National Intelligence Service, the National Police Agency, the Korea Coast Guard, and the Military Security Support Command. However, such counter-intelligence organizations can only prepare for typical military and political security, and in the present reality of coexisting with various security threats, restrictions must arise to properly respond to security factors.

4.5.2. Problems to be expected and improvements

Then, if the scope of the counter-intelligence agency is expanded, it should be considered to what extent to which agency to add it. Under the counter-intelligence business regulations, counter-intelligence is essentially for the national interest, and national interest means that it can be threatened by various security threats. Furthermore, counter-intelligence organizations to respond to this will inevitably vary. In other words, interpreting

counter-intelligences regulations in an era of comprehensive security or human security requires all types of acts that may violate national interests and core values of the country to be considered counter-intelligences, as well as those subject to infringement.

If so, the definition of passive anti-spy agencies like this is limited, and the possibility of government departments in various areas such as economic and industrial security, advanced IT technology, munitions acquisition, international crime, and cybercrime should be considered first. In other words, organizations such as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance(DUSTOMS), the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy(MOC), the Ministry of Defense(DAPS) should participate in preparing for economic threats, and the Financial Services Commission(Financial Information Analysis Institute) should participate. Of course, the administrative branch itself presented above is not recruited as an anti-spy agency, but it is necessary for affiliated organizations to participate or create(or concurrently) a separate department to engage in anti-spy affairs.

However, criticism could be raised over the expansion of the counter-intelligence agency. First of all, the passive attitude of precedents to the scope of the National Intelligence Service's job may be problematic. Our supreme court views Article 3(1) of the National Intelligence Service Act, which sets the scope of the job of the National Intelligence Service, as a restrictive enumeration regulation whether it is an example regulation or a restrictive enumeration regulation[22].

Therefore, if the court's attitude is maintained, related agencies, not counter-intelligence agencies, will inevitably become passive except for foreign contact management under Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the anti-spy regulations. Aside from the regret over the court's passive attitude toward the changed security environment, it is necessary to push for a plan to reorganize related agencies into counter-intelligence agencies to overcome the court's position.

The problem follows the expansion of these sector espionage agencies. Multiple ministries are in charge of espionage because it could lead to confusion in espionage and further hollowing out the espionage. Of course, the National Intelligence Service established a National Defense Strategy Meeting under the National Intelligence Service in November 2018, and the National Intelligence Service established a anti-defense information sharing center to coordinate and control the overall anti-defense operation. However, if the anti-spy information sharing center is actually established, the relationship between the actual authority and the similar information sharing center under the National Intelligence Service(NIS), counter-intelligence business regulations, and anti-terrorism laws can be ignored[23].

In other words, if the scope of the anti-spy equipment is expanded as above, there is a need for revision to improve counter-intelligence operations to end up in a state of concern over confusion in the counter-intelligence operations. Therefore, a higher control mechanism is needed to prevent confusion in counter-intelligence operations. Therefore, it would be possible to consider long-term ways to establish a higher organization such as the U.S. intelligence community to coordinate and control information activities of intelligence agencies as well as counterintelligence operations.

4.6. Specification of means of collection and verification of counter-intelligence intelligence

Counter-intelligence is efforts to protect their intelligence activities both analytically and actively[24]. Therefore, the premise of counter-intelligence is that there is a counter-intelligence target, and it needs to be collected, defended, and attacked[25]. In other words, it is necessary to collect intelligence on forces that undermine national security and produce it as information to evaluate the threat to national security. Then, how to collect such intelligence here and how to determine the reliability and validity of the intelligence collected and produce it as information, and the basis is inevitably required. However, in this study, only the collection of human information is considered, which is a particularly controversial part of HUMINT.

4.6.1. Problems of collecting humint

Human Intelligence Collection (HUMINT) is an information activity that utilizes humans as a means of intelligence gathering, consisting of two pillars: intelligence officer and agent. Intelligence officers need to impersonate themselves so that their status is not exposed in certain tasks, which are divided into heads of public offices and heads of non-public offices. In addition, spies can be classified again as spies who actively recruit intelligence officers to work for intelligence organizations after laying the basis for information activities and cooperators who volunteer to help themselves.

In carrying out specific espionage operations, informants must pretend to be identified, and legal grounds are needed to ensure the salinity and validity of information activities. In addition, legal grounds will be needed for cooperators. The intelligence officer's status is clear in that he is an employee of the spy agency, and the general intelligence officer has a sufficient review of the agent's characteristics and purpose by the intelligence officer, and his legal status and credibility are guaranteed to some extent. However, not only is the status unclear, but there is essentially a question of reliability. In addition, it should be considered that spying by cooperators could lead to diplomatic and legal problems in the future.

Therefore, considering the rule of law in espionage, there should be a provision for evidence that anti-spy employees can pretend to be identified in specific tasks, and a stipulation that the credibility of information collected by cooperators can be verified.

4.6.2. Improvement of humint in normative aspects

First of all, it is the best way to improve the status of intelligence officers. Public officials who perform anti-spy duties should not be suspected by the person subject to anti-spy duties, so they need to have a head of status to reach the anti-spy target. In terms of judicial control over espionage, it is not only necessary but also reasonable to stipulate that public officials in espionage agencies can assume the status. This is because the rule of law on information can be applied on the basis of clear grounds for identity theft in the real world, and the possibility of protection for public officials who are in the position of identity can be increased.

Secondly, it is the basis for cooperative management. In order for spy agencies to acquire spy intelligence, it would be the best way for intelligence officers to infiltrate the target and collect intelligence themselves, but the target group that wants to undermine national security is naturally based on closure, so internal cooperators inevitably have great significance. However, leaving the operation of the cooperator to the judgment of the intelligence officer can result in abuse of the operation of the cooperator, and there is a possibility of reprimanding the judgment of the intelligence officer itself in the event of future problems. Therefore, it is necessary to have a legal basis for intelligence officers to operate cooperators. Similar legislation stipulates that current security business regulations can conduct background checks to investigate loyalty, sincerity, and reliability to the state for national security. This is recognized for its minimal relevance in that the purpose of legislation itself is to carry out security affairs, but it does not prescribe cooperators for those subject to the background check. Therefore, separate legislative measures are required.

To this end, it will be possible to first consider the requirements for the need to operate cooperators and the requirements for supplementation to prevent indiscriminate cooperation. In order to meet these requirements, whether or not the spy service cycle has been met can be the basis for judgment. The use of agents is a general procedure for operating a cooperator, which goes through the process of "targeting – evaluation – recruitment – management – closure".

The use of personal information (especially sensitive information) can be raised because the target selection process includes not only accessibility to that intelligence but also an assessment of the person himself. Articles 15 and 24 of the current Personal Information

Protection Act restrict the collection of personal and sensitive information, but may be treated exceptionally if consent is obtained from the information entity or permitted by law. Therefore, if a basic law to regulate anti-spy affairs is enacted and a stipulation for the operation of cooperators is established, it can be seen as having all the conditions for the cooperative operation system under the legislative system.

Third, it is necessary to verify the reliability of intelligence collected through cooperators. Not only is the information provided by the collaborator itself suspected of being reliable, but there is also the possibility of a double agent intentionally infiltrated by the other party, so the debriefer should doubt the reliability and double agent of the information he provides[26]. In order to verify reliability, an entity may first consider the right to verify facts or request data to be submitted, the review of financial transaction details, etc. In other words, it may be necessary to inquire about public officials or construction organizations and request them to report necessary matters or send documents to them, or to receive information on transactions of financial institutions by a specific person.

The Criminal Procedure Act, which is a follow-up procedure for such matters, prescribes inquiries to public offices, etc. by means of arbitrary investigation. Pursuant to Article 199(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, an investigative agency may request public officials or other construction organizations to report necessary matters concerning the investigation or execution of a sentence, and in such cases, there shall be no restrictions on matters to be inquired. In addition, Article 4 of the "Act on Real-name Financial Transactions and Secrets" prohibits prosecutors or law enforcement officers from requesting financial institutions to provide transaction information for investigation without the consent or warrant of judges. And such procedures are likely to be viewed as arbitrary investigation[27].

Such procedures are prescribed in the investigation process, but there are currently no such procedures in the pre-procedure of espionage. In the case of espionage, the violation of the law(national security and national interests) has not occurred in reality, but the possibility or risk of infringement is very high, and there is a high possibility of infringement of the basic rights of the people. Therefore, it is necessary to stipulate in the regulations of the law how to verify the reliability of the arbitrary investigation procedures such as the inquiry of public officials, the request for financial transaction information, and the request system for the provision of communication facts[28]. Although the Criminal Procedure Act, the Financial Real Name Transaction and Confidentiality Act, and the Communications Secrets Act may be considered, these laws are basically based on criminal or law violations, so there is room for systematic confusion. Therefore, it is a reasonable choice in the legislative system to prescribe such inquiries, etc. of public offices in the new statutes.

4.7. Block political access to counter-intelligence

One of the most difficult aspects of the academic approach to anti-spy activities in our society was the politicization of counter-intelligence. As the so-called controversy over politicizing information is inevitable, espionage is bound to become an area of intelligence gathering on domestic politics, and some argue that overcoming this phenomenon is the direction of espionage[29]. Of course, this is a recognition from the dark side of Korean society where Korean intelligence agencies were involved in domestic politics, and it is a valid point.

Therefore, the most important issue in improving anti-spy activities in the future is to overcome the politicization of such counter-intelligence and not only institutional improvement but also to form a national consensus.

5. Outro

Forming a new mechanism for internal and external environment is changing rapidly and national security information and conversion is requested aware of. In other words, a new

level of information in the most contentious battlegrounds to say that the era of war. Nevertheless, we stay in the 20th century Cold War is the sense of security incidents and don't get out of a fixed idea that "anti-espionage = North". In addition, our overall criminal justice system is still a state that threatens the safety crimes investigation according to a changing global environment, and response system is weak or dictionary. Role of the intelligence agencies or other systematic investigation of efforts for improvements in performance while enjoying a shortfall. Anti-espionage counter new paradigm established in an era of change is now urgently requested.

In response, this study reexamined the current security criminal law system in Korea, especially the current status and problems of the anti-spy business regulations, which are the basis for the performance of anti-spy operations. Based on this, to establish a new anti-spy paradigm in response to the era of transformation, the government highlighted the necessity of enacting a basic law on anti-spy affairs and reviewed specific problems and improvement measures to be included in the law. In summary, the main points are to be replaced by conclusions.

The first is the expansion of the concept and scope of the anti-spy. In other words, if the Framework Act on Anti-Spy is enacted, the concept of anti-spy should be set as an active and active anti-spy concept, not a passive or passive anti-spy concept, to diversify anti-spy operations and respond to both traditional and non-traditional threats. In addition, the government proposed the expansion of spy agencies to cope with the diversification of security threats due to changes in the information environment.

Second, he pointed out existing problems and made some forward-looking suggestions regarding the smooth performance of anti-spy operations. The most important confirmation here is the stipulation of the means of collection and verification of anti-spy information. The method of collecting anti-spy intelligence can be distinguished in legal and realistic ways, and the factual methods such as collecting human information, technical information, and public source information are problematic. In particular, legal grounds and reliability, such as undercovering the identity or operating an informant, are problematic in the intelligence officer's performance of specific espionage tasks. In order to dispel this, it was confirmed that there was a need to establish a basis that the spy agency could impersonate its identity in specific tasks, a legal basis that the spy agency could operate a cooperative, and a stipulation that could verify the reliability of the information collected by the cooperator.

The last thing I want to emphasize is the establishment of people's strong will and awareness of national security, and the establishment of consensus on the improvement of the security and criminal justice system in response to the changed times. This is because the ideology and values of liberal democracy that we have achieved through blood and sweat, and the world-class economy, welfare, and happiness can never exist without the Republic of Korea. Therefore, the government should not neglect to establish policies, institutional reform, and strengthen public relations activities to the public.

6. Reference

6.1. Journal article

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7. Appendix

7.1. Authors contribution

Initial name		Contribution
Author	WP	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>